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THE IllSTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMPEACIDviENT AND 
TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The impeachment and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton 
are not over. To be sure, roughly two months after the House of Repre-
sentatives had impeached the President for perjury and obstruction of 
justice,1 the Senate fully acquitted the President.2 The challenge re-
mains, however, for historians, constitutional scholars, political scien-
tists, and others to assess the reasons for, and ramifications of, the 
President's impeachment proceedings. 
* Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary; Visiting Professor, Duke Law 
School (Spring 2000). I am grateful to have had the chances to refine my thiuking about the sub-
ject matter of this Essay in conversations over the past eight months with Alex Aleinikoff, Akhil 
Reed Amar, Michael Les Benedict, Susan Low Bloch, David Broder, Robert Dailek, Walter Del-
linger, Neal Devins, Father Robert Drinan, Michael Fitts, Deboralt Gerhardt, Jeff Greenfield, 
Thomas Griffith, Ron Kahn, Neil Kiukopf, Mike Klarman, Alan Meese, John McGinnis, Thomas 
Merrill, Glenn Reynolds, Michael Remington, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Chris Schroeder, Paul 
Schwartz, and Laurence Tribe. I am also grateful for the comments on this Essay made by faculty 
participants in programs held at St Louis Uuiversity, Wake Forest, and the University of Wiscon-
sin Law Schools. 
I. On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives approved two articles of im-
peachment against President Clinton. The first article, charging the President with giving 
"perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury," 145 CONG. REc. S40 (daily ed. Jan. 
7, 1999), passed by a vote of 228-206. See 144 CONG. REc. Hl2,040 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998). 
The second article, charging that the President, through at least one or more of seven acts, had ob-
structed the sexual harassment lawsuit filed against him by Paula Jones, see 145 CONG. REc. S40 
(daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999), passed by a vote of221-212. See 144 CONG. REc. atH12,041-42. 
2. On February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President on both of the articles ap-
proved by the House. By a vote of 55-45, the Senate rejected and therefore found the President not 
guilty of the misconduct charged in the first article. See 145 CoNG. REc. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
1999). In a split 50-50 vote, the Senate found the President not guilty of the misconduct alleged in 
the second article. See id. at S1458-59. 
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The purpose of this Essay is to undertake this challenge. In doing 
so, it takes a different path than that which has been taken in recently 
published (and anticipated) books and articles or commentary on the 
President's impeachment and acquittal.3 The common problem that all 
impeachment studies must confront is the vagueness of the constitu-
tional standard of impeachment,4 a vagueness that is widely regarded as 
impeding principled decision-making in this area. The typical response 
of commentators to this vagueness has been to search for some principle 
to rigidly govern or direct impeachment proceedings. Typically, this 
quest leads interpreters to apply to the impeachment process norms de-
rived from outside of the constitutional framework for impeaching and 
removing high-ranking federal officials. Yet, this Essay suggests that 
perhaps the most helpful perspective for explaining and predicting the 
ramifications or lessons of the Clinton impeachment proceedings is 
historical, i.e., examining the degree to which the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings followed or deviated from patterns and practices of, includ-
ing the norms reflected in, impeachment history. This perspective re-
veals aspects of the proceedings, including some of its consequences, 
that have been missed in the burgeoning literature on the President's 
impeachment and trial. This perspective reveals, for instance, that the 
President's impeachment fits quite easily within a disturbing pattern 
over the last two decades5 in which Congress' inertia in initiating im-
peachment inquiries has allowed federal prosecutors to trigger such in-
vestigations by making referrals to Congress.6 Indeed, of the six offi-
cials who were the subjects of such referrals, President Clinton is the 
only to have remained in office.7 Moreover, the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings themselves demonstrated that, contrary to conventional 
3. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 9-14 
(1999); ELIZABEI'H DREW, THE CoRRUYnON OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND 
WHY 211-58 (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INvEsTIGATION, IM-
PEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PREsiDENT CLINTON (1999); BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE 
PREsiDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE 457-517 (1999); see also Background and History 
of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. ill (1998) [hereinafter House Hearing] (testimony of 19 law professors, 
including this Essay's Author); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Im· 
peachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REv. 631, 637-638 (1999); John 0. McGinnis, Impeachable De-
fenses, POL'Y REv., June-July 1999, at 27, 27; Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After 
the Clinton Sex Scandals, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647, 650-51 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,Im-
peaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 279, 281 (1998). 
4. See PosNER, supra note 3, at 100, 170. 
5. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
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wisdom, the system worked, though by no means perfectly. Those 
seeking the removal of a President or some other high-ranking official 
must run through a gauntlet of constitutional and procedural impedi-
ments designed to make impeachment, and particularly removal, diffi-
cult, as confirmed by the fact that of the sixteen officials impeached by 
the House, only seven have been removed from office.8 These obstacles 
include, among others, getting not just a majority of the House but also 
(the all-important requirement of) a supermajority in the Senate to con-
sent to the removal;9 vesting the impeachment and removal powers in 
authorities that must make their judgments with the knowledge or 
awareness that they will likely be held politically accountable for them 
(an outcome that is especially likely after the ratification of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, 10 which made Senators directly elected by the voters 
of their respective states); the unique fmality of any judgment (for it is 
not subject to presidential veto or in all likelihood to judicial review11); 
and the ensuing knowledge of House members and particularly Senators 
that any judgments must withstand the test of time. Those obstacles en-
sure that the impeachment process is not a substitute for civil or crimi-
nal proceedings but rather exists to address the most serious charges of 
misconduct that have seriously injured the constitutional system of gov-
ernment and are linked to an official's public duties or that have robbed 
the official of all moral authority to continue to discharge the duties of 
his office. 
The purpose of this Essay is to assess fully these and other expla-
nations for and likely consequences of the impeachment and acquittal of 
President Clinton. Part I examines several possible explanations for the 
President's impeachment and acquittal. These explanations include the 
increasing influence of federal prosecutors (in this case, the Independent 
Counsel12) to trigger the impeachment process; the degree to which 
President Clinton's popularity became a major obstacle to his removal; 
the institutional advantage of a President over his political foes to 
spread his message throughout the media; the ways in which the me-
dia's coverage of the President's impeachment proceedings turned the 
public off and hastened the end of the proceedings; and the relative dis-
8. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 23 (2d ed. 2000). 
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
10. See id. amend. XVII. 
11. See GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 118-46. 
12 See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 
732 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)). 
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advantages of an independent counsel, as compared with a special 
prosecutor appointed by the President, to engage in a public relations 
battle with the White House. 
Part III examines almost a dozen possible consequences of the 
President's impeachment and acquittal, many of which parallel or re~ 
confirm the lessons of past impeachment proceedings. First, President 
Clinton's acquittal confirms the aptness of House Judiciary Chairman 
Henry Hyde's prediction at the outset of House impeachment proceed~ 
ings against President Clinton that impeaching or removing the Presi~ 
dent could not be done "without bipartisan support."13 In every im~ 
peachment proceeding, the burden is on those seeking the impeachment 
and removal of some official to establish the seriousness and nonparti~ 
san basis of their charges.14 Those seeking to remove the President ulti-
mately failed to carry this burden in the Senate.15 
Second, the President's impeachment and acquittal confirm the 
important distinction between constitutional and political legitimacy. It 
demonstrated that something might be constitutional (such as the House 
and the Senate's unreviewable discretion to conduct impeachment pro~ 
ceedings as they each see fit) but still be politically problematic (such as 
the House's decisions to render its final impeachment judgment in a 
lame duck session and to forego independent fact fmding, decisions that 
became the basis for attacking the House's procedural choices as parti~ 
san or unfair in the Senate trial).16 
Third, the President's impeachment proceedings demonstrated that, 
contrary to the warnings of many Democrats, a presidential impeach~ 
ment trial does not necessarily paralyze the executive branch or the na~ 
tiona! economy. Most work of the executive branch is done not by the 
President but by his subordinates, and much of the paralysis that pre~ 
ceded and followed the President's impeachment trial is not a direct 
consequence of the misconduct that gave rise to his impeachment pro~ 
ceedings. Even though Congress did little else during the few months in 
13. Ronald Brownstein, A Hard Lesson in Partisan Politics, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at 
A18. 
14. See generally Wll.LIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC JM. 
PEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PREsiDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 114-34 (1992) 
(suggesting different reasons for the acquittal of Justice Chase, including the absence of any seri-
ous abuse of power that was otherwise nonredressable). 
15. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Edwards, 145 CONG. REc. S1576 
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Lautenberg, id. at S1506; Levin, id. at S1543. 
16. See Bruce Ackerman, Lame-Duck Impeachment? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, 
atA27. 
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which the impeachment proceedings lasted, it also had not done much 
for most of the two years preceding it. 
Fourth, President Clinton's impeachment and acquittal exposed 
several fatal flaws in the Independent Counsel Ad7 that led to biparti-
san support for its dismantlement at the end of June 1999. Not the least 
of these flaws was the complete inability of an independent counsel to 
maintain the impartiality or credibility of his or her investigation in the 
face of full-scale political attacks waged by a President or his defenders. 
Fifth, the President's impeachment and acquittal sent mixed signals 
on which, if any, alternatives to impeachment (such as censure) are 
constitutionally legitimate. Though neither the House nor the Senate is-
sued a censure resolution and the Senate failed to issue findings of fact 
in the course of the impeachment trial, these failures are not necessarily 
attributable to constitutional defects in these possible alternatives or 
supplements to impeachment. 
Sixth, the Clinton impeachment proceedings clouded the important 
question about whether there are different standards for impeaching 
Presidents and judges. Though the President's lawyers and some aca-
demic commentators insisted that this difference was crucial for not 
making the President impeachable for misconduct (such as lying under 
oath) that has led to the impeachments and removals of a few federal 
judges, 18 most members of Congress never explicitly addressed this 
question. Indeed, a majority of neither the House nor the Senate ever 
endorsed this argument, and the few members who did rejected ie9 
Moreover, the President's acquittal is not inconsistent with a uniform 
standard for impeaching Presidents and judges. 
Seventh, the President's acquittal is likely to have strengthened the 
office of the presidency. The President's acquittal raises serious ques-
tions about whether or to what extent Congress will have the resolve to 
conduct lengthy investigations of misconduct by popular Presidents. In 
contrast, the Clinton impeachment proceedings might have exposed the 
vulnerability of the federal judiciary to political retaliation. For some of 
the most important things that helped President Clinton to survive the 
threat of removal-i.e., his public support and the comprehensive media 
scrutiny-are absent from lower federal judges' impeachment proceed-
17. 28 u.s.c. §§ 591-99. 
18. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
19. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Frist, 145 CONG. REc. S1528 (daily 
ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Gorton, id. at S1464; Inhofe, id. at S1662; Thompson, id. at S1551; Charles T. 
Canady, The Argument for When a President Should Be Removed From Office, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 
17, 1999, at 30. 
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ings. Whatever defects one might have identified in the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings would clearly be exacerbated in a hearing of 
which there is no media coverage and about which the public is largely 
indifferent. 
Eighth, the Clinton impeachment proceedings demonstrated the 
extraordinary social costs of around-the-clock news coverage on cable 
and broadcast television (as well as on radio) and increasing opportuni-
ties for spreading rumors and information on the Internet. These devel-
opments have led to a sharp increase in news programs substituting 
speculation and focus on scandal for traditional news coverage of facts 
and figures. 20 The increased media focus on speculation and scandal 
have turned off much of the public, which has responded by developing 
the ability to cut through the morass of information spilled on it to de-
termine the information that it wants or needs.21 
The proliferation of news outlets has led to an increase in the op-
portunities for law professors to comment on public events such as the 
President's impeachment and trial. In providing their commentary on 
the President's impeachment proceedings, many academics risked, 
however, their professional stature and credibility. In fact, many aca-
demics claimed to be acting as neutral or nonpartisan commentators 
while maintaining (undisclosed) contacts with the President or his po-
litical foes. Many other academics did not hesitate to offer public pro-
nouncements on the impeachment proceedings, though such proceed-
ings did not fall within their areas of expertise. The possibility that legal 
commentators might have sacrificed some of their or their profession's 
credibility in the public's mind underscores the need for such commen-
tators to take more seriously, in the future, their obligations to disclose 
more candidly political ties and professional credentials. 
Finally, the Clinton impeachment proceedings serve as a dramatic 
reminder that an impeachment is not a substitute for civil and criminal 
proceedings, but a special political proceeding in which there are 
uniquely political punishments to redress political crimes that are 
committed by high-ranking officials. The President's acquittal signifies 
that presidential misconduct can be dealt with in a variety of means 
other than impeachment, including civil and criminal proceedings, the 
court of public opinion, the judgment of history, and perhaps even cen-
sure. The President's acquittal does not signify that Congress in any 
20. See Caryn James, One Screen Could Not Capture It All, N.Y. DMEs, Dec. 20, 1998, nt 
33. 
21. See Jacob Heilbrunn, Whatever Happened to the Moral Majority? Moderates are Mak-
ing Rebellious Noises, But Far Right is Finnly in Control, L.A. DMEs, Feb. 28, 1999, at M2. 
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way condoned his misconduct. To the contrary, no President in history 
has been subjected to such widespread condemnation by Congress. Such 
condemnation should not be taken lightly as an alternative to formal 
impeachment and removal. 
IT. EXPLAINING THE IMPEACHMENT AND ACQUITIAL OF PREsiDENT 
CLINTON 
There has been a lot of speculation about the reasons for President 
Clinton's impeachment and acquittal, but the most likely explanations 
are those that put the President's impeachment proceedings in historical 
perspective. The first, most obvious explanation of the outcome in 
President Clinton's impeachment trial consists of the stated reasons that 
Senators have given for casting their acquittal votes. The most serious 
problem with relying on such statements is that not all Senators pro-
duced them. Only seventy-two Senators published such statements.22 
These seventy-two included only thirty-four of the forty-five Demo-
cratic Senators who voted not guilty on both articles of impeachment, 
four of the five Republicans who voted not guilty on both impeachment 
articles, and three of the five Republicans who voted not guilty on the 
first but guilty on the second article of impeachment.23 Of those thirty-
eight Senators who published statements on their reasons for voting not 
guilty on both articles, more than half-twenty-seven-explained that 
they did not regard the misconduct alleged in either article of impeach-
ment approved by the House as constituting an impeachable offense.24 
Sixteen of the thirty-eight-all Democratic Senators-explained that the 
partisan zeal of the House Managers in the Senate proceedings and of 
the Republican leadership in the House affected their votes,25 while fif-
22. See Published Closed Door Statements 145 CoNG. REc. S1471-1637 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
1999) (statements of72 Senators). 
23. See id. at S1458 (noting that by a vote of 55-45, the Senate found the President not 
guilty of the misconduct charged in the first article); id. at S 1459 (noting that in a 50-50 split vote 
the Senate found the President not guilty of the misconduct in the second article of impeachment). 
24. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Akaka, 145 CoNG. REc. S1576-77 
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Biden, id. at S1476-77; Boxer, id. at S1512; Breaux, id. at S1501; 
Bryan, id. at S1610; Cleland, id. at S1542; Collins, id. at S1568; Dorgan, id. at 81619; Durbin, id. 
at 81532; Graham, id. at 81560-61; Harkin, id. at S1573; Hollings, id. at 81628; Jeffords, id. at 
S1597; Johnson, id. at 81474-75; Kennedy, id. at 81567; Kerry, id. at S1620; Kohl, id. at 81547; 
Leahy, id. at 81579; Levin, id. at S1543; Lieberman, id. at 81601; Lincoln, id. at S1626; Mikulski, 
id. at S1498; Moynihan, id. at S1560; Reid, id. at S1574; Sarbanes, id. at S1504; Snowe, id. at 
1546; Wellstone, id. at S1597; and Wyden, id. at S1629. 
25. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Akaka, id. at S1576; Biden, id. at 
81476; Boxer, id. at S1512; Bryan, id. at S1609; Dodd, id. at S1593; Dorgan, id. at S1619; Durbin, 
id. at S1531; Harkin, id. at 81573; Hollings, id. at S1628; Kennedy, id. at S1566; Lautenberg, id. 
356 HOFSTRA L4 W REVIEW [Vol.28:349 
teen Democratic Senators Goined by Republican Arlen Specter) ex-
plained that the House Managers had not proven the misconduct alleged 
in either article of impeachment. 26 Two Republican Senators indicated 
that they had voted not guilty on the first article of impeachment (and 
guilty on the second article) even though they believed that all the 
charges against the President had been proven,27 while another Republi-
can Senator, Fred Thompson, explained that he had voted not guilty on 
the first article (but guilty on the second) based on his belief that the 
former was impossible to defend against because it was vague and did 
not specify the statements in which the President had allegedly perjured 
himself.28 
These numbers do not tell the full story of the President's im-
peachment and acquittal. Consequently, one could try to explain the 
event further in partisan terms. Notably, all thirty-five votes to convict 
the President on the first article and all fifty votes to convict him on the 
second article were cast by Republicans.29 Well over 95% of the votes 
at SI506-07; Leahy, id. at SI578; Moynihan, id. at SI560; Sarbanes, id. at SI503; Wellstone, id. 
at SI597; and Wyden, id. at SI629. Interestingly, one of the reasons often cited as a basis for 
President Johnson's acquittal is overreaching or overzealousness on the part of some of the House 
Managers who prosecuted him. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 247. 
26. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Akaka, 145 CONG. REC. Sl577 {daily 
ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Biden, id. at SI480; Dodd, id. at Sl594; Durbin, id. at Sl531; Edwards, id. at 
SI575-76; Feingold, id. at Sl465; Kennedy, id. at SI567; Kerry, id. at S1620; Lautenberg, id. at 
S1560; Levin, id. at S1543; Mikulski, id. at Sl498; Murray, id. at S1472; Rockefeller, id. at 
SI632; Sarbanes, id. at SI503; Specter, id. at SI539; and Wyden, id. at Sl629. Senator Robb ex-
plained that he voted not guilty on the first article because he did not believe that the House Man-
agers had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the President had committed peijury in his grand 
jury testimony; but he voted not guilty on the second article because it illegitimately bundled so 
many charges together that defending against it was a virtual impossibility. See id. at S1510. In 
Senator Robb's opinion, the second article was drafted to allow at least two-thirds of the Senate to 
vote in favor of it though most would have disagreed over the specific misconduct for which they 
were voting to remove the President See id. at SI510-ll. 
27. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Gorton, id. at S1462; and Stevens, id. 
at Sl599-1600. 
28. See Fred Thompson, Senate Trial of Clinton Is Over, and It's Time to Move On, 
KNOXVIT..LENEWS-SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 1999, at All. 
29. See Alison Mitchell, Censure is Barred: But Rebuke from Both Sides of Aisle Dilutes 
President's Victory, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1999, at AI [hereinafter Mitchell, Censure is Barred]. 
Only 19 of the Senate's 55 Republican members (who participated in the impeachment trial) are 
up for reelection in the year 2000, but 13 of the 19 come from states that President Clinton carried 
in the 1996 presidential election. See Fred Brown, Senators to Watch, DENVER PoST, Feb. 10, 
1999, at liB. Of these 13, the following nine Senators voted to convict the President on both arti-
cles of impeachment: Spencer Abraham from Michigan, John Ashcroft from Missouri, Mike 
De Wine from Ohio, Bill Frist from Tennessee, Rod Grams from Minnesota, John Ky1 from Ari-
zona, Connie Mack from Florida, William Roth from Delaware, and Rick Santorum from Pennsyl-
vania. See 145 CONG. REc. SI458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999). Shortly after the trial, Connie 
Mack announced that he would not run for reelection. See Carl Hulse, Senator Mack, a Florida 
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cast in the House to impeach the President were cast by Republicans.30 
Yet, Democrats arguably acted throughout the proceedings in at least as 
partisan a fashion as their Republican counterparts. In the House, over 
95% of the votes cast in opposition to the President's impeachment 
were cast by Democrats.31 Moreover, at the outset of the impeachment 
trial, it was clear that if the forty-five Senate Democrats were to vote as 
or close to a block in opposition to the President's removal it would be 
numerically impossible for him to be convicted. In fact, no Democratic 
Senator bolted from his or her party to vote for either article of im-
peachment,32 while ten bolted from the Republican contingent to vote 
Republican, Will Retire, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1999, at AS. Of the 13, three voted to acquit the 
President on both articles of impeachment-Olympia Snowe from Maine, Jim Jeffords from Ver-
mont, and John Chafee from Rhode Island. See 145 CoNG. REc. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
1999). Chafee announced shortly before the end of the trial that he would not run for reelection. 
See Alison Mitchell, Senator Chafee Plans to Leave At End ofTenn, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1999, 
at A21. One of the thirteen-Slade Gorton from Washington-split his vote on the articles, finding 
the President not guilty on the first, but guilty on the second article of impeachment. See 145 
CONG. REc. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999). 
30. Interestingly, more than one-third of Republicans who voted for the first article of im-
peachment (88 of the 223) represent districts that President Clinton carried in the 1996 presidential 
election. See Chuck Raasch, Votes to Impeach Could Haunt House GOP, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 
1998, at 7A. Nevertheless, the 223 Republicans who voted to impeach President Clinton on the 
fust article represented districts that, on average, gave President Clinton only 43% of their vote in 
1996 (six percentage points less than he received nationwide). See id. Moreover, President Clin-
ton's share of the 1996 vote averaged only 40% in the districts of Republican members of the 
House Judiciary Committee. See id. Only two of the 13 House Managers won reelection in 1998 
by close margins. See David Von Drehle, At the End, Prosecutors Defend Their Own Convictions, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at A4; State-By-State House Results, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at 
A37. In contrast, four of the five Republicans who voted against both impeachment articles repre-
sent districts that Clinton won in 1996. See Raasch, supra at 7 A. 
31. Only 14 of the 201 Democrats who voted against the first impeachment article represent 
districts that Republican presidential nominee Bob Dole carried in 1996. See Raasch, supra note 
30, at 7 A. The latter 201 Democrats represented districts in which President Clinton received an 
average of 59% of the vote in the 1996 presidential election. See id. Four of the five Democrats 
who voted for impeachment came from districts that Republican presidential nominee Dole carried 
in 1996. See id. The fifth, Paul McHale, was the only one of the five who did not stand for reelec-
tion in November 1998. See id. 
32. Fourteen of the Senate's 45 Democrats who voted to acquit the President on both articles 
of impeachment occupy seats that are up for reelection in the year 2000. See Norah M. O'Donnell, 
Few Democrats in Peril: Republicans Aim to Keep Majority in 2000 Cycle, RoLL CALL, Jan. 25, 
1999, at 7. Eleven of the 14 come from states that the President had carried in the 1996 presiden-
tial election-Akaka (Hawaii), Bingaman (New Mexico), Bryan (Nevada), Feinstein (California), 
Kennedy (Massachusetts), Kohl (Wisconsin), Lautenberg (New Jersey), Lieberman (Connecticut), 
Moynihan (New York), and Sarbanes (Maryland). See The I996 Elections: State By State, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1996, at B8. Three of the 14 come from states that Republican presidential candi-
date Bob Dole carried in 1996-Conrad (North Dakota), Kerrey (Nebraska), and Robb (Virginia). 
See id. Three of the 14-Bryan, Lautenberg, and Moynihan-have announced that they would not 
run for reelection. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Senate Democrats Reach Outside Party, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 1999, atA24. 
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against the first article and five Republicans voted against the second 
article of impeachment. 33 • 
The President's impeachment and acquittal could also be explained 
in light of a disturbing trend in the federal impeachment process-the 
increasing influence of federal prosecutors in triggering impeachment 
investigations and proceedings.34 One telling but overlooked fact regard-
ing President Clinton's impeachment proceedings is that they marked 
the sixth occasion in the past three decades in which Congress exercised 
or contemplated seriously using its impeachment power.35 No other 
comparable period of time in American history has featured as much 
impeachment activity. One important factor linking all six of these im-
peachment efforts is that they were each triggered by a referral to Con-
gress from an external investigative authority. Four of the six impeach-
ment efforts-involving Judges Claiborne, Hastings, Nixon, and 
Collins-were referred to the House by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.36 The other two began with referrals to Congress from 
two specially appointed federal prosecutors-Leon Jaworski, who, as a 
33. See Mitchell, Censure is Barred, supra note 29, at Al. 
34. Several related factors helped to explain this trend, including but not limited to the ex-
pansions of the federal judiciary, federal criminal law, and numbers and resources of federal 
prosecutors. See GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 58-60. 
35. Besides the impeachment and removal attempt against President Clinton, other im-
peachment efforts were undertaken against: President Richard Nixon (who resigned from office in 
1974 shortly after the House Judiciary Committee had approved three articles of impeachment 
against him); Harry Claiborne (impeached and removed from a federal district judgeship for tax 
evasion in 1986); Alcee Hastings (impeached and removed from a federal district judgeship in 
1989 for perjury and bribery); Walter Nixon (impeached and removed from a federal district 
judgeship in 1989 for making false statements to a grand jury); and Robert Collins (who resigned 
from a federal district judgeship in 1993 after having been convicted and imprisoned for bribery 
and threatened with impeachment). See id. at 25, 36, 39, 54-SS; see also United States v. Collins, 
972 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that convictions of federal judges are proper since the 
Executive Branch may target federal judges even without reasonable suspicion). A seventh offi-
cial, Robert Aguilar, had his conviction for illegally disclosing a wiretap and attempting to ob-
struct a grand jury investigation overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit en 
bane but resigned from his federal district judgeship as part of a deal to avoid being re-prosecuted. 
See David Dietz, No Retrial but No Job for Aguilar: Judge Resigns tl' Get lAst Charge Dropped, 
S.F. CHR.oN., June 25, 1996, at Al. In the early 1970s, then-Representative Gerald Ford introduced 
an impeachment resolution in the House against Justice William 0. Douglas, but the House de-
cided not to initiate formal impeachment proceedings against the Justice. See GERHARDT, supra 
note 8, at 29, 54. 
36. See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMEs, FOLL!ES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL 
IMPEACHMENT TRIALs 294 (1992) (Claiborne); id. at 309 (Hastings); id. at 314 (Walter Nixon); 
see also Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of 
Federal Judges, 1993 U.ILL. L. REv. 809, 828 (stating that Collins resigned after he was referred 
to the House for impeachment). 
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special prosecutor appointed by the Attorney General,37 referred to the 
House several boxes of materials relating to the possible impeachable 
misconduct of President Nixon;38 and former judge and Solicitor Gen-
eral Kenneth Starr, who, as an independent counsel appointed pursuant 
to the Independent Counsel Act,39 referred, pursuant to a special provi-
sion of the Act,40 evidence that, his office believed, demonstrated Presi-
dent Clinton's commission of possible impeachable offenses. Only one 
of these referrals resulted in a Senate acquittal (President Clinton); three 
of the referrals culminated in the formal removals of the targeted offi-
cials (Harry Claiborne, Walter Nixon, and Alcee Hastings);41 and two 
culminated in forced resignations (President Richard Nixon42 and Judge 
Robert Collins).43 
President Clinton's impeachment is distinctive not only because it 
is the only referral to Congress that resulted in the subject's remaining 
in office. It is also distinctive because of the House's failure to under-
take any independent fact fmding.44 Indeed, President Clinton's im-
peachment proceedings in the House are one of only three in which the 
House undertook no independent fact finding.45 The first was the 
House's impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.46 The House failed 
to take evidence because it had previously undertaken limited fact 
fmding in two prior unsuccessful efforts to impeach Johnson 47 and re-
quired little provocation to initiate another. By firing Stanton, Johnson 
gave the proponents of his ouster something that they had not previ-
ously had-an act that, in their view, clearly violated the Tenure in Of-
flee Act,48 and as an illegal act was, therefore, impeachable.49 Moreover, 
37. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN 
AMERICANPOLIDCS 19 (1992). 
38. See STANLEY I. KOTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD 
NIXON 482 (1990). 
39. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 
732 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)). 
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). 
41. See House Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 368-71. 
42 See KOTLER, supra note 38, at 527-50. 
43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text 
44. See CONG. REc. S1582 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (introducing a brief offered by Senator 
Leahy, Procedural and Factual Insufficiencies in the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, 
noting the failure on the part of the House Judiciary Committee to conduct its own independent 
fact finding inquiry). 
45. See BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 134-37,293-94. 
46. See id. at 134-137. 
47. Seeid. 
48. The Tenure in Office Act, which passed over Johnson's veto, provided in essence that all 
federal officials whose appointment required Senate confirmation could not be removed by the 
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Johnson's impeachment for having fired Stanton has been widely re-
garded as one of the most intensely partisan impeachments rendered by 
the House (thereby making it a dubious precedent to follow).50 Simi-
larly, the failure of the House to undertake any independent fact finding 
prior to impeaching President Clinton provided a basis (largely absent 
in the five other referred impeachment matters in the last few decades) 
upon which the House's impeachment judgment could be attacked as 
partisan or unfair. 
The second instance in which the House failed to undertake any in-
dependent fact fmding was the impeachment of Harry Claiborne. 51 The 
full House impeached Claiborne within a month of the House Judiciary 
Committee's formal recommendation of impeachment articles against 
Claiborne.52 The Committee unanimously voted to recommend im-
peachment articles within three weeks of the House's formal initiation 
of an impeachment inquiry against Claiborne.53 Unlike President John-
son before him and President Clinton after him, Claiborne did not com-
plain about the House's proceedings (including its failure to undertake 
any independent fact finding); he welcomed a quick impeachment, be-
cause he believed the sooner he had a full trial in the Senate the sooner 
he would be fully vindicated. 54 
No doubt, another institution that had an enormous impact on the 
President's impeachment proceedings was the media. First, the media's 
increasing splintering or fragmentation into countless outlets (including 
newspaper, network and public television, cable, the Internet, and radio) 
has intensified competition to get news, particularly breaking news, to 
engage in speculation or commentary, rather than report facts, and to 
keep or increase audiences. 55 This splintering or fragmentation has made 
it much more difficult for a single force or group to dominate the news. 
President without the Senate's approval. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 166-67 (1926). 
The Supreme Court declared that act unconstitutional. See id. at 176. 
49. See BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 137; REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 216-18. 
SO. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 251-52. 
51. See BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 293-94. 
52. See id. at 294. 
53. See id. at 293. 
54. See id. at 292. 
55. See generally BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF 
MixED MEDIA vi (1999); Symposium, Just the Facts?, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 22 
(explaining objectivity and the obligations of journalists to their readers); David A. Anderson, 
Democracy and the Demystification of Courts: An Essay, 14 REv. LmG. 627 (1995) (explaining 
the media's influence on the courts); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Pri-
vacy, News, and Social Change; 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1992) (exploring changes in 
the media and its effect on the right to privacy). 
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Nevertheless, the President as an institution has several important ad-
vantages over Congress in being covered by and in spreading messages 
through the media.56 It is much easier to cover a single individual than it 
is to cover many people who are all acting at once but not in concert. It 
is thus easier to cover a President, who as a single person is the em-
bodiment and leader of an entire institution, whereas covering Congress 
institutionally is difficult because it operates through the actions of sev-
eral hundred individuals. Moreover, the President has considerably 
more resources to gain media attention or access than any given mem-
ber of Congress; he has more agents available to spread his messages, 
and he has more media permanently attached to and covering his activi-
ties than any other governmental official.57 Consequently, President 
Clinton's (and his defenders') criticisms of the Independent Counsel's 
investigation and of the House's case against him received much more 
widespread and consistent coverage than any of the counter-attacks. 
To be sure, the splintering of the media has made it much easier for 
critics of a President to fmd an outlet to publicize their charges against 
him. Such public attacks can service several ends, including deflecting a 
President's attention or energy and thereby hampering or impeding his 
achievement of certain preferred objectives.58 In this sense, the media 
has wreaked havoc by facilitating the destruction of or damage to a 
President's reputation by a thousand little cuts or attacks.59 The Presi-
dent can lose popularity or some degree of public support from these as-
saults, but in the end his office allows him a decisive advantage over his 
political foes or attackers because of the unique resources available to 
him to gain easy access to and spread his message through the national 
media.60 Moreover, recourse to the bully pulpit and the national media 
enables a President to go over the heads of his political opposition in 
Congress (or elsewhere) to urge the American people to support either 
him personally or his agenda.61 
56. See SAMUEL KERNEl.L, GOING PUBUC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PREsiDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
179-80 (1986); JEFFREYK. Tuus, THE RHETORICAL PREsiDENCY 186-89 (1987). 
57. See Tuus, supra note 56, at 186-89. 
58. See Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
RoUNDTABLE 143, 165 (1998). 
59. See id. at 165-66. 
60. See id. at 166. 
61. See Hany W. Reynolds, Jr., 544 ANNALS 223 (1996) (reviewing FORREST McDONALD, 
THE AMERICAN PREsiDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1994)); Cass R. Sunstein, An Eight-
eenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World, 48 ARK. L. REv. 1, 3 (1995); Tiefer, 
supra note 58, at 165. 
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Second, the media helped to make the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings the first in which the public's preferences helped to drive the 
fmal outcome. Throughout the President's impeachment trial, his ap-
proval ratings held steady at or near 67%.62 Similarly, a majority of 
Americans throughout the proceedings steadily opposed the President's 
removal from office.63 (In contrast, the Senate's acquittal of President 
Johnson opposed the public's preferences.t Yet, by a plurality of 44% 
to 37%, the American people believed that the President was guilty of 
the misconduct charged in the first article,65 and 67% believed that he 
had violated various laws.66 These statistics can be reconciled on the 
ground that, as one poll found, 76% of the American people believed 
that the case against the President involved purely private misconduct 
that should not have been made the basis for his impeachment.67 An-
other poll found most of the public did not regard the charges made 
against the President as constituting appropriate grounds for his re-
moval. 68 In other words, most of the public did not regard the Presi-
dent's conduct as impeachable. The Democrats' steady opposition to the 
President's removal plainly tracked the preferences of most Americans. 
The media's coverage might have had various other effects on the 
public (or at least the 61% of the public that regularly followed the 
hearings) and through public opinion on the members of Congress.69 
First, it might have constantly reminded the public, as well as members 
of Congress, particularly Senators, of the House Managers' difficulty in 
arguing convincingly that the President had breached the public trust-a 
classic prerequisite for impeachment-as long as the public did not re-
gard its trust with the President as having been breached. 
Second, the media's constant airing of bashing of Clinton's integ-
rity throughout his presidency (particularly for the more than nine 
months that preceded the formal impeachment inquiry against the Presi-
dent) might have lowered the public's expectations regarding the Presi-
dent's integrity.70 New allegations of presidential misconduct would not 
62. See Mark Z. Barabak, Public Calls Trial Panisan, Wants It to End Quickly, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 1999, atAl. 
63. Seeid. 
64. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 242. 
65. See Barabak, supra note 62, at A1 
66. See Josh Getlin, The Truce Behind the Culture Wars, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at Al. 
67. See id. 
68. See Kenneth T. Walsh, The Price ofVictory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 1999, 
at26, 30. 
69. See Barabak, supra note 62, at Al. 
70. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 55, at 81, 87. 
1999] THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPEACHMENT 363 
have surprised much of the public or shifted its basic opinion of the 
President.71 
Third, the media's apparent obsession with finding the next Water-
gate might have increased the public's skepticism about the neutrality or 
accuracy of news coverage. The rhetoric with which the media charac-
terized every new scandal of the Clinton White House--e.g., Filegate,72 
Travelgate,73 Monicagate/4 Whitewater,75 Chinagate,76 Koreagate77 -had 
been phrased to liken President Clinton's scandals to those of Richard 
Nixon, but the public found the comparisons wanting. The repeated at-
tempts to liken the President's scandals to Watergate, particularly be-
fore full investigations had been launched, might have led much of the 
public to conclude that the President's harshest critics and the propo-
nents of his impeachment were akin to the boy who cried wolf. 
Fourth, the media's coverage might have turned off or alienated the 
public. The pro-prosecution bias of the media might have turned off 
some people, while prolonging the hearings held little, if any, prospect 
that anything new would happen.78 In virtually every poll, the vast ma-
jority of Americans indicated their opposition to the impeachment pro-
ceedings almost from the beginning and that they were sick and tired of 
the trial by the time it was over.79 As reported by the media (andre-
flected in phone calls, faxes, and e-mails to members of Congress), the 
public's exasperation, if not boredom, with the coverage of the trial, as 
well as with the trial itself, coupled with the public's steady opposition 
to the removal of the President, intensified pressure to end the hear-
ings.so 
71. Indeed, one new book, by Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, suggests, based on an em-
pirical study of all of the radio, television, and cable stories during the proceedings, that the me-
dia's coverage had a pro-prosecution bias that turned off much of the public. See id. at 77. 
72. See, e.g., Jerry Nachman, The Watchdog, Now Grown Rabid, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 
1999, § 4, at 13. 
73. See, e.g., id. 
74. See, e.g., id. 
75. See, e.g., id. 
76. See, e.g., William Safire, Essay, Two Men, Walking, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1999, at A19. 
77. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Gatemania, AM. PROSPECf, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 13. 
78. See infra note 79. 
79. The most recent empirical studies of the news coverage of the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings indicate that the media's penchant for scandal and speculation led much of the public to 
discount the media's interpretation and make up its own mind about events. See KOVACH & 
ROSENSTIEL, supra note 55, at 77-78. Once the public had made up its mind about the impeach-
ability of the President's misconduct, it did not waiver throughout the remainder of the proceed-
ings. 
80. For two excellent descriptions of the Clinton impeachment proceedings as both cause 
and effect of a culture war, see id. at 77-86, and PoSNER, supra note 3, at 196-216. 
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ill. THE POSSIBLE LESSONS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S IMPEACHMENT 
AND ACQUITTAL 
As one moves from possible reasons for the President's impeach-
ment and acquittal to the likely lessons that will be drawn from the ex-
perience, the focus of the inquiry shifts. This step requires a shift from 
relying primarily on inferences from empirical data to determining how 
subsequent generations, particularly subsequent Congresses, have un-
derstood the significance of each previous grand inquest. Obviously, we 
can only speculate about the range of possible lessons or consequences 
of the President's impeachment and acquittal, based on some of the spin 
that already is being applied to the event (by those for and against the 
President's removal) and the consequences that roughly similar events 
have had in the past. Of course, it remains to be seen which lessons will 
withstand the test of time and which possible consequences do in fact 
arise. 
A. The Importance of Party Unity 
The first likely lesson is that the Democrats' uniform opposition to 
the President's conviction highlights the enormous difficulty (if not the 
impossibility) of securing a conviction in a presidential impeachment 
trial as long as the Senators from the President's party unanimously 
stand by him. Rarely does a political party dominate more than two-
thirds of the seats in the Senate. Hence, the solidity of the Democratic 
ranks in President Clinton's impeachment trial dramatically illustrated 
that removal of a President is possible only if the misconduct is suffi-
ciently compelling to draw support from both sides of the aisle for a 
conviction. In the absence of bipartisan support for removal, acquittal is 
virtually guaranteed. (The likelihood of this result is also an obvious 
consequence of the constitutional requirement that at least two-thirds of 
the Senate must vote to convict in order for a removal to occur.81 The 
supermajority requirement makes conviction and removal highly un-
likely, for it is no easy task to get such a high degree of consensus 
among Senators, particularly when the stakes are so high. When such 
consensus is achieved, it is likely to be the result of a very compelling, 
credible case for conviction and removal.) 
81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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B. The Difficulty of Impeaching a 
Popular President 
365 
The second consequence of the President's acquittal is that it 
shows that impeachment is a relatively ineffective check against the 
misconduct of a popular President. The President's acquittal might 
leave subsequent generations unsure about whether Congress will have 
the resolve in the future to conduct impeachment proceedings against a 
President with high approval ratings. The congressional investigation 
into Watergate took more than two years, before the discovery of the 
"smoking gun"-the tapes of certain conversations in the White 
House-that led to President Nixon's resignation.82 The Clinton im-
peachment proceedings took roughly six months from start to finish.83 
As such, they were among the shortest in American history, with the 
shortest having been the impeachment proceedings against Andrew 
Johnson, which lasted roughly three months from start to finish.84 Even 
so, the relative shortness of President Clinton's impeachment proceed-
ings was too long for most people. While it is true that most people did 
not believe President Clinton's case involved legitimately impeachable 
offenses, some investigations might not uncover seriously problematic 
misconduct (insofar as the public is concerned) for some time. Future 
members of Congress might think several times before engaging in a 
relatively prolonged investigation of a President's misconduct, for fear 
that they might alienate the public. (In this respect, the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings could be viewed as strengthening rather than 
weakening the office of the presidency.) The Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings raise a question about just how serious must the misconduct of 
a popular President be to convince a majority of Americans to support 
his removal from office. It is possible that impeachment will be effec-
tive only for the kinds of misconduct that can galvanize the public to set 
aside its approval of a President's performance to support resignation or 
formal removal. Indeed, a future Congress might support removal only 
if it has direct evidence of very serious wrongdoing and unambiguous 
consensus (in Congress and among the public) on the gravity of such 
wrongdoing. 
82. See KUTLER, supra note 38, at 187-527. 
83. See Bill Miller, Starr Spent $7 Million During Impeachment Period, WASH. POST, Oct 
1, 1999, at A15. 
84. See BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 137-59. 
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C. The Greater Vulnerability of Judges and 
Unpopular Presidents to Impeachment 
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President Clinton's impeachment proceedings might also have un-
derscored the greater vulnerability to impeachment and removal of 
those officials who lack a President's resources (such as recourse to the 
bully pulpit) or popularity. It is conceivable that an unpopular President 
such as Andrew Johnson might meet a different fate in an age in which 
the media constantly applies pressure to investigate a President's mis-
conduct (or actions that have made him unpopular) and in which daily 
polls can dramatize a loss of popularity and increase in support for re-
moval. In this circumstance, removal or resignation might be extremely 
likely. (To date, the only instance like this occurred during the final 
days of Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public for the first and 
only time during the Watergate investigation expressed support for the 
President's ouster based on information revealed in the Watergate 
tapes.85) The dynamic is likely to be even more problematic for a federal 
judge, perhaps even a Supreme Court Justice, whose hearings are not 
likely to get anything near the widespread media coverage that President 
Clinton's proceedings got, or the outpouring of public support (or the 
public's opposition to the prolongation of hearings). In the absence of 
these factors, a federal judge or other low-profile official simply lacks 
the resources available to a President (particularly a popular one) in de-
fending against political retaliation in the form of an impeachment. 
D. The Burden in an Impeachment Proceeding 
The fourth lesson of the Clinton impeachment proceedings is that 
the burden in an impeachment proceeding is on the advocates or propo-
nents of impeachment to show that the charges have not been based on 
or motivated by partisanship.86 No doubt, a proponent of President 
Clinton's impeachment and removal might claim the charges were not 
based on partisanship but rather the needs to protect the integrity of the 
judicial system and to ensure the President's compliance with his oath 
of office (even in a civil lawsuit whose focus is unrelated to his official 
duties). Yet, those charging Justice Chase87 and President Johnson88 with 
impeachable misconduct argued the very same thing; they claimed that 
85. See KUTLER, supra note 38, at 531-32. 
86. See THE F'EDERAUST No. 65, at 396-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
87. See REHNQUJST, supra note 14, at 74-76. 
88. See id. at 226-27. 
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the charges against those officials were based on those officials' re-
spective abuses of authority and not on partisanship.89 Ultimately, those 
seeking the removals of President Johnson and Justice Chase failed to 
carry their burdens (for a critical mass of Senators and for posterity).90 
Similarly, those seeking President Clinton's removal from office have 
failed (thus far) to convince most Americans (as well as any Democrat 
in the Senate) that their charges against the President were not based or 
motivated to a significant degree on partisan dislike for the President. 
The latter failure increases the chances that subsequent generations 
will look disfavorably upon the House's impeachment of President 
Clinton. There have been similar failures in the past (most notably, in 
the impeachment attempts against Justice Chase in 1805 and President 
Johnson in 1868), and the majority vote cast in favor of convicting both 
officials did not preclude either's impeachment from being subse-
quently viewed as lacking political legitimacy by subsequent genera-
tions and Congresses. Johnson's and Chase's acquittals have each had 
the effect of dissuading subsequent Congresses from bringing or initiat-
ing impeachments based on similar misconduct. Subsequent Congresses 
have been able to take such postures in part because the outcomes in 
Chase's and Johnson's trials did not turn on disputes about the underly-
ing facts.91 Virtually everyone at the times of those respective impeach-
ments agreed on the facts, but they disagreed over the significance of 
the facts.92 Unencumbered with having to resolve factual disputes, sub-
sequent generations and members of Congress have been free to make 
their own assessments of the legal and constitutional significance of the 
facts (and thus of Chase's and Johnson's misconduct). They have con-
cluded that the misconduct targeted in each impeachment did not war-
rant removal from office.93 
By similar reasoning, the Clinton acquittal could be construed by 
subsequent members of Congress as rejecting the House's judgment on 
the impeachability of the President's misconduct. For one thing, the 
vote to impeach the President was (as it was in Chase's and Johnson's 
cases) largely cast along party lines, while there has been relatively 
widespread perception (at least among the public) that the proceedings 
generally were conducted and resolved on partisan grounds.94 Moreover, 
89. See id. at 74-76, 226-28. 
90. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
91. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 88-89, 226-28. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. at 277-78; infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
94. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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most people (including most members of Congress) do not disagree 
much, if at all, about the underlying facts in President Clinton's case; 
they disagree over the legal significance of the facts. Subsequent Con-
gresses might conclude that if such misconduct could not merit a con-
viction in one case (i.e., Clinton's), it would be inconsistent or unfair to 
allow it to become the basis for a conviction in another case. In addi-
tion, subsequent members of Congress could conclude that if a majority 
vote by the Senate to convict both Chase and Johnson could not save 
either's impeachment from being regarded as illegitimate, the absence 
of a majority vote in the Senate for either article of impeachment 
against President Clinton (coupled with other criticisms of it) could be 
viewed as an even rounder rejection of the legitimacy of the House's 
case than were the Senate votes in Chase's and Johnson's trials.95 
E. The Distinction Between Constitutional and 
Political Legitimacy 
The fifth possible lesson to be derived from President Clinton's 
impeachment and trial is that it affirmed the House's and the Senate's 
final, nonreviewable discretion to conduct its respective impeachment 
95. This rejection could be construed as the Senate's perfonning, as expected by the Fram-
ers, an important checking or balancing function. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERicAN REPUBUC 1776-1787 513-17 (1969) (suggesting that the Framers expected that the 
Senate would function with more coolness, more system, and more wisdom, than the popular 
branch because its members would be drawn from the elite of society and as a result of its longer 
term and insulation from direct public pressure). One might counter this assertion in at least two 
ways. One might argue that the balancing was achieved in President Clinton's trial only because of 
the uniform partisanship of the Democrats in opposing removal. See supra notes 24-25 and ac-
companying text It is, however, always possible in an impeachment trial that the Senators from a 
President's political party might be inclined to oppose his removal. This possibility, coupled with 
the constitutional requirement of supermajority support among the Senators for removal, makes it 
incumbent upon those seeking the President's removal to bring charges and otherwise make a case 
against him that could draw bipartisan support. In President Clinton's trial, they failed to do so. 
See supra notes 9, 81 and accompanying text 
Another counter to the claim that the Senate performed a balancing function in President 
Clinton's impeachment trial is that some of the Framers' expectations regarding such a checking 
function might no longer be valid in light of the Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments. See U.S. 
CaNST. amend. XII, xvn. By reducing the importance of the Electoral College to the election of a 
President, the Twelfth Amendment and other electorial reforms have transformed the presidency 
into a popularly elected office. Moreover, the Seventeenth Amendment changed the system for 
selecting Senators from election by their respective state legislatures to popular election in their 
respective states. The alterations effected by the Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments at the very 
least have increased sensitivity in the impeachment process to the attitudes of the electorate re-
garding the necessity for either impeachment or removal as well as toward the President who 
might be the subject of the proceedings and the Representatives or Senators who sit in judgment of 
him. See id. 
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proceedings. In the course of President Clinton's impeachment proceed-
ings, both the House and the Senate followed the holding in Nixon v. 
United States,96 in which the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that 
challenges to the constitutionality of Senate impeachment trial proce-
dures are nonjusticiable.97 The Court recognized in the Senate fmal, non-
reviewable authority to devise impeachment trial procedures as it saw 
fit.98 Consequently, the House and the Senate took great liberties in 
fashioning their respective impeachment proceedings against President 
Clinton as each saw fit. For example, in relatively controversial deci-
sions, the House decided not to call any live witnesses or otherwise un-
dertake any independent fact finding,99 to hold a fmal vote on the im-
peachment articles in a lame duck session, 100 and to forego defining or 
adopting a uniform standard for defming the impeachability of certain 
misconduct. In the House, the members also decided for themselves 
such questions as the applicability of the Fifth Amendment due process 
clause, the appropriate burden of proof, and the propriety of allowing 
three of their colleagues to cast votes on the articles even though each 
had already been elected to the Senate and would have the opportunity 
96. 506 u.s. 224 (1993). 
97. See id. at 238. 
98. See id. 
99. See supra notes 49, 51-52 and accompanying text 
100. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Yale Law Professor Bruce A. 
Ackerman made the provocative argument that by impeaching the President in a lame duck session 
the House had violated the Twentieth Amendment. See Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson 
Clinton, President of the United States, Presentation on Behalf of the President: Hearing Before 
the House Conun. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37 (1998) [hereinafter Impeachment Inquiry] 
(testimony of Bruce A. Ackerman). The argument received much attention from the media but for 
several reasons won no support in Congress. See id. at 47. First, the text of the amendment does 
not clearly forbid such actions. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX. Second, Professor Ackerman's ar-
gument is undercut by the fact that several earlier impeachments (including Alcee Hastings' in 
1988-89) had been carried over from one Congress to the next See Impeachment Inquiry, supra, at 
42, 69. These two factors led Professor Ackerman to shift his argument to maintaining (1) that 
lame duck impeachments are generally a bad idea, see id., and (2) a lame duck impeachment might 
be legitimate only if, like a piece of legislation passed in an earlier Congress, the House were to 
reaffirm it in a subsequent Congress prior to the Senate's acting upon it See id. at 43. The second 
argument is also undercut by the fact that several impeachment trials involved "carryover" im-
peachments. Moreover, impeachment is a more complete act than legislation passed only by a 
single house. Last but not least, Thomas Jefferson, in his influential manual on parliamentary 
practice drafted while he was Vice-President, maintained that the American system followed the 
British practice in which impeachments carried over from one Parliament to the next See Thomas 
Jefferson, Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Section 620, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 
104-272, at 13 (1997). Nevertheless, Ackerman's argument served as a reminder that by impeach-
ing the President in a lame duck session the House had arguably put at risk some of the political 
(as opposed to constitutional) legitimacy of its impeachment judgment 
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to sit in judgment on the President in his impeachment trial.101 In the 
latter proceeding, Senators decided for themselves such procedural 
questions as the appropriate burden of proof, the applicable rules of evi-
dence (including the need for live testimony), the appropriate standard 
for determining the impeachability of the President's misconduct, and 
the propriety of holding closed door hearings on a variety of issues 
(including the fmal debates on the President's guilt or innocence). 
F. The Increasing Importance of External 
Referrals in the Impeachment Process 
A sixth possible lesson to be derived from President Clinton's im-
peachment proceedings is that they underscored Congress' inertia in 
initiating impeachment proceedings in the absence of an external refer-
ral from an independent authority to initiate an impeachment inquiry. 102 
Generally, members of Congress have little incentive to put aside other 
pressing business to conduct impeachment proceedings. This reluctance 
has left a vacuum that prosecutors have filled for several decades.103 The 
problem with this trend is that criminal prosecutions or convictions that 
do not result in resignations put enormous pressure on Congress not just 
to impeach the targeted official{s) but also to defer to the external 
authority's fmdings in the course of a belated rush to judgment in im-
peachment proceedings. 
G. Obscuring Whether the Standards for 
Presidential and Judicial Impeachments are 
Similar or Different 
The Clinton impeachment proceedings also could be construed as 
confirming that there are different standards for impeaching Presidents 
and judges. A popular argument made on behalf of the President in the 
House and the Senate was that there are different standards for impeach-
ing Presidents and judges based on the officials' different tenure and re-
sponsibilities. Judges serve only "during Good Behavior"1~ and thus ar-
guably could be removed for misbehavior that includes but is not 
101. The three Representatives that were elected to the Senate were Jim Bunning, Michael D. 
Crapo, and Charles E. Schumer. See James Dao, Schumer, in Unique Role, May Get 3 Impeach-
ment Votes, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1998, at B1. 
102. See GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 29-30. 
103. See id. at 58-59. 
104. See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 1. 
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necessarily limited to impeachable offenses. 105 Moreover, Presidents are 
popularly elected, and thus the electoral process arguably operates as 
the primary check against a President's abuse of power.106 "Since a 
President presumably will return to private life after his term, he is 
available in a way a judge will not be to be held accountable for both 
civil and criminal misconduct at a time when it will not interfere with 
his official duties."107 
Several factors cut against inferring that Congress endorsed differ-
ent standards for impeaching different officials from the President's ac-
quittal. First, the constitutional language is uniform.103 Second, the as-
sertion is counter-historical.109 It conflicts with the Founders' obvious 
intention to adopt the phrase "during Good Behavior" to distinguish ju-
dicial tenure (life) from the tenure of elected officials (such as the 
President) rather than to establish the particular terms of judicial re-
moval.110 Moreover, the argument that the Constitution establishes dif-
ferent standards for impeaching Presidents and judges is a relatively 
new one in the annals of impeachment history .m For instance, President 
Johnson never made such a claim, though his impeachment had been 
preceded by four judicial impeachments, including Associate Justice 
Samuel Chase's. The most plausible precedents for this point of view 
are the impeachments and removals of Judges John Pickering (for 
drunkenness and insanity)112 and Harry Claiborne (for income tax eva-
sion),113 because in each the Judges were removed for misconduct ar-
105. For a more elaborate articulation of this argument (and the counter-argument), see 
GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 83. 
106. See House Hearing, supra note 3, at 232, 236 (testimony of Professor Susan Low 
Bloch); id. at 243 (testimony of Professor Jack Rakove). 
107. Michael J. Gerhardt, William H. Rehnquist's Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeach-
ments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 433, 
453 (1999) (book review). 
108. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). 
109. See Gerhardt, supra note 107, at 453. 
110. See GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 83-84. 
111. See Published Closed Door Impeachment Statement of Senator Paul Sarbanes, 145 
CONG. REc. S1503 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999). 
Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than other officials. As noted by 
the House Judiciary Committee in 1970, Congress has recognized that Federal judges 
must be held to a different standard of conduct than other civil officers because of the 
nature of their position and the tenure of their office. 
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-36, at 9 (1989) (House Judiciary Committee majority report ac-
companying recommended articles of impeachment against Walter Nixon)). 
112. See House Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 358. 
113. See id. at 368. 
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guably unrelated to their official duties and thus for basic misbehavior 
as opposed to official misconduct or the abuse of official power. Yet, 
neither precedent supports a looser standard for impeaching federal 
judges. In fact, Pickering was impeached and removed on the basis that 
he could no longer function as a federal judge (because of mental in-
stability and drinking) and because there was no other alternative for 
dealing with a federal judge who had, in the estimation of Congress, be-
come completely dysfunctional.114 This same reasoning led to the ouster 
of Harry Claiborne, for the House Report on Claiborne indicates that a 
central concern was that he had become completely disabled from ftmc-
tioning as a federal judge because of his criminal conduct (and convic-
tion).115 
A third reason for not construing President Clinton's acquittal as 
signaling that there are different standards for impeaching Presidents 
and judges is that allowing judges to be removed for misbehavior that 
falls short of an impeachable offense undercuts the constitutional safe-
guards against political retaliation against judges for doing their jobs.116 
The constitutional structure ceases to make much sense if judges may be 
removed either through the cumbersome, difficult process of impeach-
ment for impeachable offenses, or an easier, looser process 
(administered by Congress or by others such as judges) for misbehavior 
that does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.117 
Moreover, the fact that the consequences that might ensue from an 
attempt to impeach a President might be different from those that might 
result from the removal of a judge is not a basis for finding different 
constitutional standards for impeaching Presidents and judges.118 Rather, 
114. See 13 ANNALS OFCONG. 320-22 {1804). 
115. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, 
H.R. Doc. No. 99-688, at 23 (1986); 132 CoNG. REc. H30,251-58 (1986). 
116. See Gerhardt, supra note 107, at 454. 
117. Seeid. 
118. Judge Richard Posner and Yale Law School Professor Akhil Arnar have advanced other 
possible arguments why there must be a higher standard for impeaching Presidents than for judges. 
Judge Posner contends that because a President is elected and a judge is not, the former stands a 
much greater chance of having purely partisan or personal animus drive impeachment efforts 
against him. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 103-05. The reason this argument is not compelling is 
because a President has considerably more resources than a judge to protect himself against politi-
cal retaliation in the form of an impeachment A President can more easily counter-attack or re-
spond to the likelihood of greater partisanship in impeachment efforts directed against him than 
can a judge. Moreover, the Posnerian argument discounts the extent to which judges might pro-
voke political or partisan animus by virtue of controversial rulings. 
Professor Arnar suggests that Presidents require a higher standard of impeachment than 
judges to reflect adequate congressional respect for their popular election. See Akhil Reed Arnar, 
An( other) Afterword on The Bill of Rights, 87 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2359 (1999). Some judges are con-
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the consequences of an impeachment of any official are plainly relevant 
as factors to be taken into account in the course of applying the opera-
tive standard.119 The vesting of impeachment authority in political 
branches necessarily implies the discretion to take various factors 
(including possible) consequences into consideration in the course of 
exercising such authority .120 In addition, of the seventeen Senators who 
expressed an opinion about this issue in the Clinton impeachment trial, 
eleven (ten Republicans and one Democrat) took the position that the 
same standard applies for impeaching Presidents and federal judges.121 
firmed by the Senate, so that, as Professor Amar contends, Senators are asked in a judicial im-
peachment to reconsider their own prior judgments about the fitness of some individual to sit as a 
judge or justice. Consequently, judges can expect that they will likely benefit from an inertia in the 
Senate to second-guess itself or to admit publicly that it made a mistake in initially confirming the 
impeached judge. In contrast, because members of Congress have had no (direct) hand in electing 
Presidents, they might be less inclined to respect the process by which Presidents were elected. To 
ensure greater deference to the public will in the choice of Presidents the latter requires a higher 
standard for impeachability. See id. My disagreement with this clever argument is that none of the 
factors that Professor Amar suggests should support a different impeachment standard for judges 
and Presidents necessarily does so. Instead, they constitute no more than what they purport to be-
factors that Congress will consider in the course of rendering impeachment judgments. It is no 
different than a judge who is asked to pass judgment on an individual for breaking the law; the 
applicable law and the standards for determining guilt or innocence are the same, regardless of 
who the defendant is. Yet, for the sake of fairness or justice, the judge is likely to consider the cir-
cumstances under which the alleged commission of some criminal act occurred. In the impeach-
ment context, these circumstances include the official's special duties and tenure. 
119. See Gerhardt, supra note 107, at454. 
120. See generally ALEx SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 71-77 
(1916) (explaining that impeachment is an adequate remedy when judges fail to uphold the prin-
ciple of "good Behaviour"); Albert Broderick, Citizens' Guide to Impeachment of a President: 
Problem Areas, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 205, 229-34 (1973) (discussing the constitutional limits on 
impeachment). Cf. Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by the Staff of 
the Impeachment Inquiry, Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 93d CONG. 4 (1974) 
(stating that Parliament developed the impeachment process as a means to exercise control over 
the King); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 780, 
at 252 (rev. ed. 1991); id. § 744, at 218. 
121. For the Senators who publicly supported a different standard for impeaching Presidents 
and judges, see Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Biden, 145 CONG. REc. S1476 
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Breaux, id. at S1500; Kerry, id. at S1620; Kohl, id. at 1547; Robb, id. at 
S1509; and Sarbanes, id. at S1502. For Senators who published statements opposing the latter 
view, see Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Allard, id. at S1561; Bond, id. at S1507; 
Brownback, id. at S1605; Fitzgerald, id. at S1507; Frist, id. at S1526; Gorton, id. at 1462; Grams, 
id. at S1500; Kerrey, id. at S1505; Kyl, id. at 1532, Mack; id. at S1512; and McConnell, id. at 
1562. 
374 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 
H. Clarifying the Importance of Case-by-Case 
Analysis in Impeachment 
[Vol.28:349 
Regardless of whether subsequent generations will construe the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings as confirming that there are different 
standards for impeaching Presidents and judges, they will surely ponder 
what particular standard, if any, the Clinton proceedings endorsed for 
determining the impeachability of the President's misconduct.122 To be 
sure, neither the House nor the Senate formally endorsed a specific 
standard of impeachment. 123 Instead, it appears that there were almost as 
many standards for determining the impeachability of the President's 
misconduct as there were members of both chambers voting on the ar-
ticles of impeachment. 124 
Nevertheless, the Clinton impeachment is a dramatic reminder of 
the Framers' expectations that Congress is empowered to determine on 
a case-by-case basis the misconduct that constituted "other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors."125 The constitutional standard was designed to nar-
row the range of impeachable offenses from that which was available in 
England (where there were no restrictions on the scope of impeachable 
offenses),126 but the standard still remains rather broad. The Constitution 
contemplates that an impeachable offense is a political crime about 
whose essential elements the Framers agreed only in the abstract 
(including such general preconditions as serious injury to the Repub-
lic).127 Consequently, every impeachment (including the most recent 
one) has featured a debate over whether the misconduct charged consti-
tutes a political crime. 128 As these debates have shown, it is practically 
impossible to get the House or the Senate to adopt a uniform standard 
for determining the impeachability of misconduct. The resolution of 
these debates track the historic practice in which each member decides 
for himself or herself the proper resolution of a series of procedural is-
sues. 
129 The debates over the proper definition of impeachable offenses 
in Congress have thus featured tugs of war in which those seeking im-
peachment defend relatively broad, amorphous standards that they can 
122. See Gerhardt, supra note 107, at 454. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. at 454-55. 
125. U.S. CONST. art ll, § 4. 
126. See House Hearing, supra note 3, at 46-49 (prepared Statement of Professor Michael J. 
Gerhardt). 
127. See id. at 49-51. 
128. See GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 103. 
129. See id. at 115-16. 
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show have been easily met in a given case, and those opposing im-
peachment support very narrow standards that they claim have not been 
met in the specific circumstances of the case before them. 
While the debates over the scope of impeachable offenses in par-
ticular cases have not produced consensus among Senators on any stan-
dards, the Senate's judgments in impeachment trials do reveal an inter-
esting pattern. The seven federal officials whom the Senate has 
convicted and removed from office (all federal judgeships) have had in 
common misconduct that (1) has caused a serious injury to the Republic 
and (2) has had a nexus between the official's misconduct and the offi-
cial's formal duties. 130 In assessing the latter, members of Congress have 
taken into account the degree to which certain misconduct has been ei-
ther so outrageous or so thoroughly disabling or incompatible with an 
official's duties as to give Congress no choice but to remove an offi-
cial.131 In President Clinton's impeachment trial, several Senators ex-
plained their acquittal votes on the absence of one or more of these ele-
ments.132 
I. Lowering the Quality of Constitutional 
Discourse 
Yet another possible consequence of President Clinton's impeach-
ment is they might have left much of the public with the impression that 
impeachment is just another political event. Indeed, over 70% of the 
American people believed that the President's impeachment trial had 
been resolved largely on partisan grounds.133 This outcome is not consis-
tent with the Framers' expectations. For instance, in Federalist Number 
65, Alexander Hamilton expressed the hope that Senators in an im-
peachment trial would rise above the passions of the moment to do what 
is in the best interests of the Constitution or the nation. 134 Arguably, 
130. See id. at 54-56. 
131. See House Hearing, supra note 3, at 55-56 (written statement of Professor Michael J. 
Gerhardt). 
132. See Published Closed Door Statements of Senators Cleland, 145 CONG. REc. S1524-26 
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); Dorgan, id. at S1601-20; Jeffords, id. at S1594-96; Johnson, id. at 
S1474-75; Kerrey, id. at S1504-05; Kohl, id. at S1547-48; Lautenberg, id. at S1506-07; Lieber-
man, id. at S1600-0l; Lincoln, id. at S1625-26; Mikulski, id. at S1498-99; and Reid, id. at S1574. 
133. See ABC News Poll (Feb. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Poll) (indicating that 71% of those 
polled believed that the Senate voted on the basis of partisan politics rather than the facts); Night-
line: The Trial-Fighting to the Bitter End (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1999) (reporting on 
an ABC poll, indicating that 74% of Americans expected Senators not to vote their consciences 
but rather on the basis of partisan politics). 
134. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
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Johnson's acquittal is an example of such altruism. In contrast, the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings posed a different dynamic from the 
one that Hamilton explained the Founders had tried to guard against. 
The Founders were primarily concerned with a circumstance in which 
the public pressured Congress to remove a President (and Senators re-
sisted), but the Founders did not foresee (or, at the very least, discuss) a 
situation in which the public largely opposed, while many members of 
Congress intensely supported, removal. Interestingly, the Senate's fail-
ure to convict President Clinton followed popular sentiment, but it did 
not win the respect of the American people. The proceedings generally 
weakened the public's confidence in Congress.135 
It is possible that one facet of the Clinton impeachment proceed-
ings that reduced most people's confidence in government to operate in 
a neutral manner is the fate of censure. Censure was blocked for several 
reasons put forward by Republicans in both the House and the Senate. 
Censure opponents claimed, inter alia, that it constituted either a bill of 
attainder or an illegitimate bypass of the only constitutionally author-
ized means-impeachment-for dealing with a President's miscon-
duce36 Neither of these arguments is sound. To begin with, a bill of at-
tainder is a legislative action that seeks to impose a punishment on an 
individual in the absence of-indeed, as a substitute for-a judicial pro-
ceeding.137 A censure could qualify as a bill of attainder only if it actu-
ally imposed tangible punishment. If a censure consisted only of the 
verbal expression of critical condemnation of a President's conduct, the 
only conceivable damage that would ensue is to a President's reputa-
tion. Yet, reputation is not something that the prohibition of bills of at-
1961). 
135. See Poll, supra note 133. 
136. See, e.g., 144 CoNG. REc. H12,009-010 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (statement of Repre-
sentative Mcintosh); Guy Gugliotta & Juliet Eilperin, Judiciary Panel Shows Signs of Partisan 
Split, WASH. POST, Sept 15, 1998, at AS (quoting Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.); 
Charles Krautharnmer, The Case for a Two-Part Judgment, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1999, at A15; 
Eric Pianin & John F. Harris, Opposition to a Censure Builds Among Senate GOP, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 7, 1999, at A9 (quoting House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde); see also Rob-
ert H. Bork, Read the Constitution: It's Removal or Nothing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A21 
(stating that no conflict exists within the Constitution and that removal and disqualification are the 
only punishments the Senate may inflict); Eric Pianin & Joan Biskupic, Senators Exploring a 
Form of Censure Are Bumping into Obstacles, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at A17 (noting that 
many conservative Republicans opposed censure as unconstitutional). 
137. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-
47 (1984); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468-69 (1977); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 356, 357 (1867); Ex 
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (8 Wall.) 366, 367 (1867); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 
(1810). 
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tainder was designed to protect;138 the prohibition has had the narrower 
purpose of precluding fmes or physical punishment or imprisonment 
imposed by a legislature as a substitute for or instead of a judicial pro-
ceeding. Moreover, even if there were damage to a President's reputa-
tion, it is likely to have resulted from expression on a political subject, 
expression undoubtedly protected by the First Amendmene39 and the 
speech or debate clause.140 
The argument that censure is illegitimate because impeachment is 
the only constitutionally authorized means for Congress to punish a 
President might have struck many people as disingenuous (indeed, most 
Americans supported censure as an alternative to impeachment 
throughout the proceedings141). First, the argument that impeachment is 
the only means for dealing with a President's misconduct is misguided. 
A major argument for censure was that it was a legitimate option for 
dealing with a President's misconduct that did not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.142 Impeachment has no bearing whatsoever on 
what Congress may do with respect to the latter category of misconduct, 
for it exists as the exclusive mechanism available to Congress for re-
moving a President for impeachable misconduct.143 Second, the consti-
tutional text can easily be read as allowing rather then restricting cen-
sure. In particular, Article I, Section 3 provides: "Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States."144 This clause apparently leaves open the pos-
sibility of punishments that fall short of removal of office, such as cen-
sure. Third, the Constitution clearly allows Senators individually (by 
virtue of the First Amendment and the speech or debate clause) to an-
nounce publicly their condemnation of a President's misconduct.145 If 
the Senators may engage in such expression individually, it is not clear 
why constitutionally they may not do so collectively. There is also 
nothing in the Constitution that bars a Senator from getting a list of her 
138. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES § 6.2.2 
(1997); Thomas B. Griffith, Note, Beyond Process: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill of Attain-
der Clause, 70 VA. L. REv. 475, 476 (1984). 
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
140. See id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
141. See, e.g., ABC News Poll (Feb. 6-7, 1999); ABC News Poll (Jan. 8-10, 1999). 
142. See Carroll J. Doherty, Senate Gropes for Another Way to Record Disapproval of Clin-
ton, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 326, 326, 329 (1999). 
143. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
144. !d. art. I,§ 3, cl. 7. 
145. See id. amend. I; id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
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colleagues' signatures on a document castigating the President and then 
entering that document into the Congr~ssional Record. A censure is the 
functional equivalent of the latter action. While one could object that 
censure might be either a futile act politically or could be overused to 
frustrate or harass a President (or some other official), these are pruden-
tial, not constitutional, objections. The calculation of whether a censure 
is constitutional is separate and distinct from whether it makes political 
sense in any given case to use. 146 
Another option that clearly seems to have been a casualty in the 
Clinton impeachment proceedings is the so-called fmding of fact that 
the Senate ultimately refused to approve formally in President Clinton's 
impeachment trial. The proposal was a variation on an intriguing read-
ing of the impeachment clauses given by University of Chicago Law 
School Professor Joseph Isenbergh.147 Professor Isenbergh had suggested 
that the Constitution allowed the House to impeach and the Senate to 
convict certain kinds of officials for misconduct that did not rise to the 
level of impeachable offenses.148 According to Professor Isenbergh, only 
removal (as opposed to conviction) constitutionally required a two-
thirds vote of the Senate and proof or evidence of impeachable of-
fenses.149 Professor Isenbergh based this reading of the Constitution on 
the fact that the textual provisions setting forth the House and Senate's 
respective authorities regarding impeachment do not contain within 
them any express limitations, 150 such as that the powers must be con-
fined to the scope of impeachable offenses or, in the case of the Senate, 
to removal. In addition, the argument for the fmding of fact relies on the 
146. Prior to the House's vote to impeach President Clinton, Representative William Dela-
hunt (D-MA) sought opinions regarding the constitutionality of censure from the 19 constitutionnl 
scholars and historians who testified about the background and history of impeachment in the 
specinl hearing held by the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on November 9, 1999. See 
Letter from Representative William D. Delahunt to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House 
Judiciary Committee (Dec. 4, 1998) (on file with Author). Fourteen of the nineteen constitutionnl 
scholars indicated that they thought censure was constitutionnl. See Letter from Representative 
William D. Delahunt & Frederick C. Boucher to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
(Dec. 15, 1998) (on ftle with Author). 
147. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 
University of Chicago School of Law Occasionnl Paper No. 39 (Dec. 31, 1998) [hereinafter lsen-
bergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity]; Joseph lsenbergh, Note, The Scope of the Power 
to Impeach, 84 YALEL.J. 1316 (1975). 
148. See lsenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity, supra note 147, at 14. 
149. Seeid. 
150. Cf., e.g., U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 5 (''The House of Representatives shnll ••• have the 
sole Power of Impeachment"); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (''The Senate shnll have the sole Power to try nil 
Impeachments."); id. ("And no Person shnll be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of 
the Members present"). 
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fact that in the earlier impeachment trials of John Pickering in 1803, 
West Humphreys in 1862, and Robert Archbald in 1913, the Senate took 
separate votes on guilt and removal, i.e., once the Senate had found the 
official guilty of at least one of the articles of impeachment it then voted 
on removal.151 This analysis provoked interest among some Senators to 
find the President guilty of misconduct without removing him from of-
fice.152 This vote would have occurred before and would have been sepa-
rate from a formal vote of conviction or removal. In the views of its 
supporters, the finding of fact would have been indistinguishable from 
censure, for it would have embodied nothing more than an expression of 
opinion about whether an official had done something. As such, a find-
ing of fact conceivably would have been constitutional for the same rea-
sons as censure would have been. 
The proposed finding of fact proved problematic for several rea-
sons, not the least of which is that it rested on a flawed reading of the 
impeachment clauses. It is mistaken to read the impeachment clauses in 
a disjointed or disconnected fashion. Instead, they should be read to-
gether, as a coordinated and coherent whole. When read in this fashion, 
it is clear that the impeachment clauses all have in common the obvi-
ous-impeachment-and impeachment is necessarily defined by its 
scope. The point of enumerated powers is that powers have inherent 
limitations, and impeachment has its limits in the constitutional lan-
guage, "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."153 
To disconnect either the House or the Senate's impeachment power 
from the scope of impeachable offenses not only does damage to the 
coherence of the constitutional text and constitutional structure, it also 
opens the door to extraordinary abuse on the part of either the House or 
the Senate, for each would then be completely unchecked and un-
bounded from impeaching or convicting on whatever basis struck its 
fancy. The debates on impeachment in the constitutional and ratifying 
conventions154 clearly demonstrate that one of the Framers' most impor-
151. See House Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 358 (Pickering); id. at 360 (Humphreys); id. at 
364-65 (Archbald). 
152. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Convict, But Don't Remove, Clinton, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 
1999, at A14; Gary M. Osen & Patrick Morrisey, Finding of Fact Is Constitutional, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 1, 1999, at A20; see also Censure and the Constitution, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1998, at A30 
(arguing that censure is constitutionally permissible); Benjamin Wittes, Congress Can Censure 
Anything, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at A29 (stating that there is no constitutional barrier to a 
properly crafted resolution of censure). 
153. U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. 
154. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 8, at 3-21 (detailing the impeachment debates in 
the constitutional and ratifying conventions). 
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tant objectives in designing the impeachment process was to define nar-
rowly-certainly, much more narrowly than Great Britain had ever 
done-the scope of the impeachment power.155 The idea was to narrow 
or circumscribe the discretion of Congress in exercising the impeach-
ment power while providing clear notice to impeachable officials the 
grounds on which they could be removed from office. 
Another major problem with the fmding of fact had to do with the 
uncertainty that it was meant only to be an expression of negative opin-
ion about the President. Indeed, its timing-prior to the adjournment of 
the impeachment trial-made its status as an expression of opinion (or 
something else) dangerously ambiguous. As long as the Senate's vote 
on the fmding of fact occurred as part of the impeachment trial, it could 
easily have been confused with a vote of conviction, and no doubt some 
Senators understood it as tantamount to the latter. Undoubtedly, many 
Senators who supported the finding of fact were motivated in part by 
their desire to prevent the President from claiming vindication or acquit-
tal if the Senate failed to convict him for perjury or obstruction of jus-
tice. The finding of fact would have allowed these Senators to suggest 
that the President had in fact been found guilty of certain misconduct by 
whatever number of Senators had voted in favor of the finding of fact. 
Consequently, the finding of fact seemed to have represented for some 
Senators a device to bring about a conviction (or its equivalent) without 
the requisite vote. If the finding of fact were the same as or tantamount 
to a vote of conviction, then at least two-thirds of the Senators would 
have had to vote in favor of it in order for it to have had the effect of a 
conviction. If at least two-thirds of the Senators had voted in favor of it, 
it almost certainly would have served as a conviction, and its subject-
the President-would have been removed from office. If two-thirds of 
the Senators had not voted in favor of the finding of fact, then the Presi-
dent almost certainly would have been entitled to have claimed that the 
vote should have counted as an acquittal. Otherwise, he would have 
been prone to removal more than once in the trial. 
Indeed, if Senators had been required to take another vote on 
whether to convict (or remove) the President after having voted on the 
finding of fact, the President would probably have had good reason to 
claim a violation of fundamental fairness. For a vote on conviction fol-
lowing a vote on the fmding of fact would have appeared to have al-
lowed some Senators the chance to try to convict the President on more 
than one vote-through the vote on the finding of fact and through the 
155. See id. at 8-11. 
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subsequent vote on conviction or removal. Subjecting the President 
more than once to a vote of conviction would simply have subjected 
him to a dubious and arguably spiteful process, and the result surely 
would have been perceived to have been unfair. 
Moreover, the fact that the Senate took separate votes on guilt and 
removal in some earlier proceedings156 does not necessarily show that 
the Senate may convict for a non-impeachable offense. First, in each of 
the earlier trials in which the Senate took such separate votes, it re-
moved the official from office. 157 It is significant that in each of these 
proceedings, the Senate took a single vote on whether to remove the of-
ficial only after the latter had been found by more than a two-thirds vote 
to have been guilty on the charges set forth in any single article.158 For 
instance, the Senate voted nineteen to seven to find Pickering guilty on 
each of four articles, and then, in a single twenty to six vote, decided to 
remove him from office (with Senator William Wells from Delaware 
deciding to switch sides for the fmal vote to go with the supermajority 
because the outcome was "a fait accompli"). 159 Similarly, after a super-
majority had found Humphreys guilty on each of seven articles of im-
peachment (with the exception of one of the three specifications of mis-
conduct set forth in the sixth article), the Senate voted unanimously to 
remove Humphreys.160 In Archbald's trial, the Senate took a voice vote 
to remove him once a supermajority had found him guilty of the mis-
conduct charged in five of the thirteen articles of impeachment passed 
by the House.161 These sequences suggest that as long as two-thirds or 
more of the Senate had found an official guilty of the misconduct 
charged in at least one article, removal was inevitable. 
In contrast, the Senate failed to take any vote on removal in each of 
the impeachment trials in which at least two-thirds of its members had 
failed to fmd the impeached official guilty of the misconduct charged in 
any impeachment article. 162 This trend (particularly coupled with the se-
156. See generally House Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 357-71 (listing the articles of im-
peachment adopted in each of the prior fifteen impeachments in U.S. history, as well as the Senate 
votes on each of those articles). 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 358-360. 
159. See BUSHNELL, supra note 36, at 52. 
160. See id. at 121-123. 
161. See id. at 237-39. 
162. In the trials for each of the following impeached officials, the Senate did not take sepa-
rate removal votes after having failed to have two-thirds or more of its members vote in favor of 
guilt: William Blount (1798-99); Samuel Chase (1804-05); James H. Peck (1830-31); Andrew 
Johnson (1868); William W. Belknap (1876); Charles H. Swayne (1905); and Harold Louderback 
(1933). See House Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 357-67. In short, in every trial in which two-
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quence above) further confirms that a supermajority vote in favor of 
guilt was a prerequisite to a separate removal vote and that once this 
prerequisite was met a separate removal vote was a mere formality. In-
deed, in the 1936 impeachment trial of Halsted Ritter, the Senate took 
the position that it was not constitutionally obliged to take separate 
votes on guilt and removal. It concluded then (and has taken the posi-
tion consistently since) that a single vote to convict is all that it is re-
quired to do constitutionally.163 
J. The Death of the Independent Counsel Act 
Yet another obvious casualty of President Clinton's impeachment 
and acquittal is the Independent Counsel Act.164 President Clinton's 
tangles with the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr unleashed 
widespread reappraisals and criticism of the Independent Counsel Act/65 
and at the end of June 1999 the Independent Counsel Act was laid to 
rest with little fanfare.166 
The Clinton impeachment proceedings demonstrated two major de-
fects in the Independent Counsel Act (apart from any lingering ques-
thirds or more of the Senate failed to find the impeached official guilty of the misconduct charged 
in any impeachment article, the Senate acquitted and did not proceed with a separate vote on re-
moval. See id. 
163. See id. at 368. 
164. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)). 
165. See, e.g .• Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to Whitewater 
and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998) (with articles by Jerome J. Shestack, Michael R. Bromwich, 
George D. Brown, Samuel Dash, Katy J. Harriger, Philip B. Heymann, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Nor-
man J. Ornstein, Julie R. O'Sullivan, Cass R. Sunstein, Arthur H. Christy, Joseph E. diGenova, 
Donald C. Smaltz, and Lawrence E. Walsh); Symposium, The Independent Counsel Statllte, 49 
MERCERL. REv. 427 (1997) (with contributions from James P. Fleissner, Katy J. Harriger, John Q. 
Barrett, Judge Griffin B. Bell, Archibald Cox, Lloyd N. Cutler, Judge Lavmnce E. Walsh and 
Kathleen Clark); Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit: The Independent Coun-
sel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515 (1997) 
[hereinafter Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit]; see also Ken Gormley,Impeachment and 
the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REv. 309, 329-355 (1999) 
[hereinafter Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel] (proposing that the most effi-
cient solution to the difficulties created by the entanglement of the Independent Counsel statute 
and the Constitution's impeachment provision is the elimination of§ 595(c)); Ken Gormley, An 
Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 ·MICH. L. REv. 601, 639-92 (1998) 
(discussing the defects in the Independent Counsel statute generally, and the radical refonns that 
Congress should implement to correct those defects). 
166. See Ethan Wallison, Starr Testimony May Seal Fate of Counsel Law, ROLL CALL, Apr. 
15, 1999 at 1; Penny Bender, Reno Supports Dismantling Independent Counsel Act, GANNEIT 
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 18, 1999; Marc Lacey & Eric Lichtblau, Independent Counsel Law Faces 
Reform-Or Demise, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1999, at Al. 
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tions about its constitutionality). The first was evident in the Act's fail-
ure to provide adequate safeguards against the aggressive efforts of an 
independent counsel-Ken Starr-to influence the course of the im-
peachment proceedings.167 Starr attempted such influence through a se-
ries of actions, including but not limited to the strong characterizations 
and brief-like quality of his office's referral/63 aggressive advocacy on 
behalf of the wording or characterizations of the referral in his testi-
mony before the Judiciary Committee/69 submissions to the Committee 
in response to White House attacks on the eve of the impeachment 
vote, 170 public response to criticisms of his testimony from his former 
ethics adviser (who had quit in protest to the tenor of the testimony),171 
and assisting the House Managers to meet informally with Monica 
Lewinsky to determine her feasibility as a witness in the impeachment 
trial.172 These actions separately, and particularly together, undermined 
Starr's claims of impartiality or neutrality. The more Starr tried to inter-
ject his office into the impeachment fray, the less independent and the 
more partisan he appeared to be.173 At the very least, such actions high-
lighted the need to revise the Independent Counsel Act radically to 
constrain or preclude such actions in the future. 174 
The impeachment hearings also exposed one largely overlooked 
pragmatic justification for abandoning the Independent Counsel Act 
(apart from any lingering questions about its constitutionality). The 
problem is that an independent counsel has no means by which to de-
167. See Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 165, at 1546. 
168. See Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 
(1998). 
169. See Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's Prepared Testimony for Delivery Before the 
House Judiciary Comm., Nov. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 801023 (F.D.C.H.). 
170. See Letter from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to Heruy J. Hyde, Chair of the 
House Judiciary Comm., and John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Minority Member of the House Judiciary 
Comm. (Dec. 11, 1998)(on file with Author). 
171. See Letter of Resignation from Ethics Adviser, and Starr's Letter in Response, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at AlO; see also Samuel Dash, Sam Dash Replies, WASH. PoST, Nov. 24, 
1998, at A18 (responding to the November 22, 1998 Washington Post Editorial, " ... And Mr. 
Dash's Resignation"). 
172. See, e.g., Bob Hohler, Lewinsky Summons Ignites a Firestorm: House Managers Shake 
Up Clinton Trial, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 24, 1999, at A1; Knut Royce & Shirley E. 
Perlman, Schalars Criticize Starr Move, NE\VSDAY, Jan. 26, 1999, at A20. 
173. See Alison Mitchell, Inquiry Defended: Long Day of Questions Ends With a Display of 
Frayed Nerves, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at Al. 
174. For two excellent articles critiquing the inadequacies of the Independent Counsel Act's 
provisions regarding the relationship between independent counsel and the impeachment process, 
see Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel, supra note 165, and Julie R. O'Sullivan, 
The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193 
(1998). 
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fend effectively the integrity of his investigation in a public relations 
battle with the White House.175 In such a skirmish, the President has un-
paralleled means to undermine the so-called independence of the inde-
pendent counsel's investigation. In contrast, the system that preceded 
the Independent Counsel Act provided a strong disincentive for a Presi-
dent to attack a special prosecutor, because the latter would have been 
appointed by the President's own Attorney General and thus a Presi-
dent's attack on such a special prosecutor would appear to be an attack 
against himself.176 Such was the case with President Nixon's firing of 
Archibald Cox, a decision that backfrred against Nixon. m Firing Cox 
only made Nixon look guilty. The prospect of such backfiring has left 
most other special prosecutors who have been appointed by Presidents 
or attorneys general immune to a President's public attacks or retalia-
tion.t7s 
K Impeachment's Paralyzing Effects 
The credibility of one argument that was used to stem the tide of 
impeachment against the President-that it would paralyze the national 
government and do serious harm to national security and to the national 
economy-was another important casualty of the hearings. First, most 
of the work of the executive branch is done by subordinates 
(particularly by personnel below the level of cabinet secretaries and 
chiefs of staff). Yet, the likelihood of some paralysis in the national 
government has been inevitable over the past few years, apart from the 
impeachment, because of the division in our government between a 
Congress dominated by one party and a lame-duck President of the 
other party. Moreover, Congress helped to demonstrate the fallacy of 
this argument (at least symbolically) by allowing the President to give 
his annual State of the Union address in the evening of the very same 
day in which his lawyers had begun his defense in his impeachment 
175. Cf. Roberto Suro, Starr Blames His Accusers, Expresses Some Regret, WASH. PoST, Apr. 
15, 1999, at AI (noting that in his testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
on the future of the Independent Counsel law, Independent Counsel Starr lamented the difficulties 
of an independent counsel who is "subject to attack" politically). 
176. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. LJ. 
2307, 2317-2320 (1998). 
177. Seeid. 
178. Six Presidents appointed 10 special prosecutors from 1875 until Archibald Cox's ap-
pointment in 1973. See id. at 2311. Of these 10, two were fired-one by President Grant in 1875, 
see id. at 2312 (lending further credence to the widespread perception of corruption in the Grant 
administration), and the second by President Truman in 1952, see id. at 2316-17 (because the 
President believed that the special prosecutor had become a nuisance to his Justice Department). 
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trial. 179 In addition, the stock market remained quite strong throughout 
the proceedings.180 
Indeed, the only sign of possible damage done to the functioning of 
the national government or to the presidency because of the impeach-
ment hearings was the distrust expressed by some members of Congress 
over the timing of the President's decision to authorize military action 
against Iraq on the day before the fmal House debates on his impeach-
ment.181 One problem with these concerns is that the public did not share 
them, for the public treated the expressions of these concerns (by the 
very same people who led the movement to remove the President) with 
the same disdain with which they regarded most of the arguments made 
in favor of removing the President from office.182 To put the point 
somewhat differently, all of the people who questioned the timing of the 
President's military activities during his trial were people who were al-
ready questioning the credibility of his political decisions long before 
the impeachment proceedings had begun (including the particular cir-
cumstances that had given rise to them). 
L. The Relevance ofForafor Redressing 
Nonimpeachable Offenses 
There is no chance that President Clinton's acquittal will ever 
qualify as a personal vindication. During the hearings, virtually every 
Senator published or made public comments that included very strong 
condemnation of the President's misconduct. Those supporting the 
President's conviction condemned the President in the harshest of 
terms.183 With only one apparent exception (Senator Tom Harkin184), the 
179. See Francis X. Clines, A Double-Edged Day Ends on a Note of Hopefulness, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A19. 
180. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Nasdaq Leads Advances on All Markets: Profit Outlook Im-
proves for Technology Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1998, at Cl. 
181. The attack ended only a few hours after the House impeached the President. See John M. 
Broder, The Evolution of a President: From a Protesting Dove to a Hesitant Hawk, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 1999, at 19. 
182. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 55, at 77. 
183. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. S1501 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Senator Do-
menici) ("How can anyone •.. not conclude that this President has committed acts which are 
clearly serious, which corrupt or subvert the political and government process, and which are 
plainly wrong to any honorable person or to a good citizen?"); id. at S1568 (statement of Senator 
Collins) ("The question before us is not whether President Clinton's conduct was contemptible or 
utterly unworthy of the great office he holds. It was."); id. at S1590-91 (statement of Senator 
Grassley) ("The tme tragedy in this case is the collapse of the President's moral authority."); id. at 
S1522 (statement of Senator Roth) ("The President must be removed before the corrosive effect of 
his conduct eats away at the mle of law and undermines the legal system."); id. at S1523 
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President's defenders strongly condemned his behavior.185 His defenders 
contended repeatedly throughout the impeachment proceedings that his 
acquittal should not be construed as foreclosing other fora in which to 
hold him accountable for his misconduct.186 This widespread condemna-
tion of the President is likely to· have some historical if not some consti-
tutional significance (beyond the damage to the President's personal 
reputation and legacy). For example, it might confrrm that in our consti-
tutional system impeachment exists only for a very small or rare set of 
misdeeds, while there are other, more appropriate fora for holding 
Presidents accountable for their nonimpeachable misconduct. Indeed, 
one popular lesson to be derived from Justice Chase's acquittal is that 
impeachment is an inappropriate device for retaliating against a federal 
judge's official rulings. 187 The appropriate forum for dealing with a 
judge's mistaken rulings is the judicial system, particularly through the 
appeals process. A popular lesson drawn from President Johnson's ac-
quittal is that impeachment is an inappropriate mechanism for redress-
ing a President's mistaken policy judgments.188 Appropriate fora for 
(statement of Senator Inhofe) ("The other thing that concerns me is the reprehensible, consistent 
attitude this president has displayed over the years against women."). 
184. See id. at S1569 (statement of Senator Harkin) (''This case should never have been 
brought before the Senate. I think it is one of the most blatant partisan actions taken by the House 
of Representatives since Andrew Johnson's case was pushed through by the radical Republicans of 
his time."). 
185. See, e.g., id. at S1504 (statement of Senator Kerrey) ("Nebraskans, including me, are 
angry about the President's behavior. We fmd it deplorable on every level."); id. at S1524 
(statement of Senator Cleland) ("President Clinton has committed serious offenses. His personal 
conduct in this matter was, as I have said before, wrongful, reprehensible and indefensible."); id. at 
S1560 (statement of Senator Graham) ("Mr. Chief Justice, the President's self-indulgent actions 
were immoral. Disgraceful. Reprehensible. History should-and, I suspect, will-judge that Wil-
liam Jefferson Clinton dishonored himself and the highest office in our American democracy.''); 
id. at S1575 (statement of Senator Edwards) ("I think this President has shown a remarkable disre-
spect for his office, for the moral dimensions of leadership, for his friends, for his wife, for his 
precious daughter. It is breathtaking to me the level to which that disrespect has risen.''); id. at 
S1579 (statement of Senator Leahy) (stating that when the President shook his finger defiantly 
denying the allegations, "it was intended to mislead the American people. That statement was 
wrong."). 
186. See, e.g., id. atS1500-01 (statementofSenatorBreaux): 
For wrongful acts that are not connected with the official capacity and duties of the 
President of the United States, there are other ways to handle it. There is the judicial 
system. There is the court system. There are the U.S. attorneys out there waiting. There 
may even be the Office of Independent Counsel, which will still be there after all this is 
fmished. 
187. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 114, 277-78. 
188. See id. at 251, 260-61, 277-78. To be sure, the view set forth, for example, by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist of the significance of President Johnson's impeachment as a thoroughly partisan 
effort by some members of Congress to increase congressional power at the expense of the presi-
dency is not one on which all historians would agree. For instance, Michael Les Benedict, in his 
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dealing with such erroneous judgments include the court of public 
opinion, elections, and the judgment of history. A critical lesson for 
subsequent generations to draw from President Clinton's acquittal is 
that his misconduct did not have a sufficiently public dimension (nor 
harm) to warrant his removal from office. 189 The appropriate fora hold-
well-regarded study of the Johnson impeachment, suggested that the effort to impeach and remove 
Johnson from office was not necessarily illegitimate because of Johnson's repeated violations of 
statutes that had been passed by the Congress over his veto and Johnson's efforts to weaken the 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See MICHAEL LES BENEorcr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND 
TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 75-76 (1973). 
189. To the extent that President Clinton's acquittal turns on the belief of a critical mass of 
Senators that his misconduct did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, see supra note 24 
and accompanying text, the outcome of his trial dovetails with an important strain in the discourse 
of the Framers that a President is impeachable for his abuses of uniquely Presidential powers (that 
could not be easily redressed in other legal proceedings). This strain was evident in several differ-
ent ways. For instance, it was apparent in suggestions that impeachment was designed to deal with 
abuses of public privileges or breaches of the public trust. See, e.g., 2 JONATHAN ELUOT, DEBATES 
IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADOPTION OF TilE FEDERAL CONSTITIJTION: THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 480 (1987) (quoting from the records of the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention James Wilson's comment in reference to the President that ''far from being above 
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and his public character by 
impeachment"). The strain was also evident in the examples given by leading Framers of the kinds 
of offenses for which the President could be impeached-every example involved an abuse of of-
ficial power. See, e.g., id. at 550 (quoting James Wilson's assurance that "pardon is necessary in 
cases of treason, and is best placed in the hands of the executive. If he be himself a party to the 
guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted"); THE FEDERAUST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Haruil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
The subjects [of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial] are those offenses 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse 
or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propri-
ety be denominated POLITlCAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to 
the society itself. 
I d.; see 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TilE RATIFICATION OF TilE CONSTITIJTION 428-33 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) ("An Impartial Citizen V"). 
[S]hould the President pardon in common cases before conviction, or aftenvards for-
give notorious villains, or persons who should be unfit objects of mercy, this would be 
such a misfeasance of his office, as would subject himself to be personally impeached. 
He is as responsible for transactions in one part of his office as another. 
Id.; see 3 JONATHAN ELUOT, supra, at 500 ("Were the President to commit anything so atrocious 
[as summoning the Senators of only a few states to ratify a treaty] he would be impeached and 
convicted, as a majority of states would be affected by his misdemeanor."); 4 JONATHAN ELUOT, 
supra, at 127 (Iredell). 
[T]he President must certainly be punishable for giving false information to the Senate 
... If it should appear that he has not given them full information, but has concealed 
important intelligence which he ought to have communicated, and by that means in-
duced them to enter measures injurious to their country, and which they would not have 
consented to had the true state of things been disclosed to them-in this case, I ask 
whether upon an impeachment for a misdemeanor upon such an account, the Senate 
would probably favor him. 
Id.; see 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 427 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Representative Vining). 
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ing him (or others who might engage in similar misconduct) account-
able include not only public opinion and the judgment of history but 
also civil proceedings190 (such as Chief District Judge Susan Webber 
Wright's contempt citation against and subsequent fining of the Presi-
dent), 191 criminal prosecution, and possibly censure.192 
M. The Institutional Deficiencies of the 
Media and the Legal Academy 
The media and law professors (or at least many of those who 
commented publicly on the Clinton impeachment proceedings) are not 
likely to emerge from the Clinton impeachment proceedings as winners. 
On the one hand, the hearings demonstrated the media's increasing pen-
chant to substitute speculation and scandal reportage for coverage of 
actual facts and figures. In a recent empirical study of the media's cov-
erage of the Clinton impeachment proceedings, it appears as if the me-
dia were not only biased in favor of the prosecution193 but also that this 
bias led much of the public to turn away from the media for guidance 
through the historic event of the President's impeachment. This devel-
opment is both good and bad. It is good in that it reflects a demise in the 
media's supposed ability to lead or shape public opinion-it flatly failed 
to do so in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. Instead, the public 
demonstrated its penchant for cutting through the morass of information 
What are [the President's] duties? To see the laws faithfully executed; if he does not do 
this effectually, he is responsible. To whom? To the people. Have they the means of 
calling him to account, and punishing him for neglect? They have secured it in the 
Constitution, by impeachment, to be presented by their immediate representatives; if 
they fail here, they have another check when the time of election comes around. 
/d.; see id. at 379 (Madison) ("[I]fthe President should join in a collusion with [an executive] offi-
cer, and continue a bad man in office, the case of impeachment will reach the culprit, and drag him 
forth to punishment."). 
190. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 35 
(1999). 
191. See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Orders Clinton to Pay $90,000 to Jones's lAwyers, N.Y. 
TIMEs, July 30, 1999, at Al3; see also Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d IllS, l120 (E.D. Ark. 
1999). In her contempt citation of President Clinton, Chief Judge Susan Webber Wright concluded 
that "the President's deposition testimony regarding whether he had ever been alone with Ms. 
LewinskY was intentionally false, and his statements regarding whether he had ever engaged in 
sexual relations with Ms. LewinskY likewise were intentionally false." /d. at 1130. Consequently, 
Judge Wright fined the President for the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiffs' attorneys 
as a result of his testimony and by the judge in attending to the deposition. See id. at 1134. She 
also referred the matter "to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for 
review and any [disciplinary] action it deems appropriate." /d. at 1135. 
192. See Gerhardt, supra note 190, at 35. 
193. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 55, at 77. 
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dumped on it to find the data that it wants or needs. Yet, it is not a good 
development for the media to be abdicating or risking its traditional 
function to inform the public about important news events. 
On the other hand, law professors hardly distinguished themselves 
as positive forces in shaping or influencing public discourse throughout 
the proceedings. First, many law professors fell prey to the media's 
push towards speculation and scandal rather than the reporting of actual 
events or even-handed coverage.194 More than a few professors could be 
found engaging in hyperbole both for and against the President's re-
moval from office. The hyperbole undermined the quality of public dis-
course on the President's impeachment. 
Second, many professors professed to be acting neutrally or with-
out a political, personal, or partisan agenda though in fact they had been 
acting at the request of the President, his friends, House members, 
Senators, interest groups, or the President's political foes. There are no 
governing standards for measuring or guiding legal commentary on 
public events, but common sense suggests that more than a few profes-
sors risked their credibility (at least with their colleagues if not also 
their students and members of Congress) by not being more forthcom-
ing about their allegiances or biases. 
Third, the extraordinary proliferation of news outlets increased ex-
ponentially the chances for legal commentators to pontificate on the 
federal impeachment process. More than a few professors professed or 
exhibited expertise about a field or process in which they were not ex-
perts.195 At the very least, law professors need, if for no other reason 
than the preservation of their credibility with their colleagues, students, 
and the general public, to disclose or to be more candid about their per-
sonal and political ties and about their professional limitations and cre-
dentials. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate significance of President Clinton's acquittal will de-
pend on its meaning to future Congresses and generations. The most 
194. I should acknowledge that during the President's impeachment proceedings, I served as 
CNN's full-time, resident expert on the federal impeachment process. I leave it to others to deter-
mine whether I was able to avoid the pitfalls described here. 
195. To compound the problem, the networks turned to so-called expert commentazy on the 
impeachment proceedings from more than a few lawyers who had gained prominence in the news 
coverage of the OJ. Simpson murder trial. It defies common sense to believe that some knowledge 
about civil or criminal trials makes one an expert on the federal impeachment process (and vice 
versa). In all likelihood, this fact was not lost on much of the viewing or listening public. 
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likely prospects for enduring lessons are those that the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings reaffirmed. One such lesson is that it is not 
possible to remove a President from office without bipartisan support. 
In other words, a successful presidential impeachment requires making 
charges against a President and proving misconduct whose seriousness 
or gravity is sufficiently compelling to draw support from both of the 
major parties in Congress. Moreover, what was true about the im-
peachment process in the 19th century still seems true at the end of the 
20th century-that impeachment is not a substitute for criminal or civil 
proceedings but rather a special mechanism for dealing with abuses or 
breaches of uniquely presidential powers or privileges and in so doing 
serves the very limited function of restoring the constitutional order to 
full health.196 Moreover, foreclosing one fora of presidential account-
ability-impeachment-does not necessarily mean that others, such as 
civil and criminal proceedings, the court of public opinion, history, and 
perhaps censure, are unavailable.197 
Another conceivable lesson is that impeachment proceedings are 
about more than the fate of a particular impeached official. Impeach-
ment proceedings, like few if any other political and constitutional 
events in our system of government, test every institution with whom 
they come into contact. Consequently, President Clinton's impeachment 
proceedings, like those against President Johnson and President Nixon, 
revealed a great deal about the institutions of the presidency and Con-
gress. There is little or no question that the office of the presidency 
saved Johnson from removal in spite of his widespread unpopularity .193 
In the end, enough Senators refused to convict Johnson at least in part 
because of the repercussions such an outcome would have had on the 
presidency itself.199 The office did not save Richard Nixon, partly be-
cause his conduct was widely regarded as constituting serious abuses of 
196. See O'Sullivan, supra note 174, at 2206 n.53 (citing and quoting from a wide variety of 
primary and secondary sources on the unique functioning of impeachment as a means not of pun-
ishment, but rather of protecting the integrity and well-being of the constitutional order). 
197. See Gerhardt, supra note 190, at 35. 
198. See REHNQUIST, supra note 14, at 243. 
199. See, e.g., id. at 248. 
Whether Andrew Johnson should be removed from office, justly or unjustly, was com· 
paratively of little consequence-but whether our government should be Mexicanized, 
and an example set which would surely, in the end, utterly overthrow our institutions, 
was a matter of vast consequence. To you and Mr. Grimes it is mainly due that im-
peachment has not become an ordinary means of changing the policy of the govern-
ment by a violent removal of the executive. 
ld. (quoting letter from Senator Dixon to Senator Fessenden). 
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uniquely presidential trusts.200 In contrast, President Clinton's miscon-
duct, however disreputable, was not perceived by most Senators as 
having a sufficiently public dimension or serious injury to the constitu-
tional system to warrant his removal from office. As such, his miscon-
duct is most similar to the income tax fraud for which the House Judici-
ary Committee refused to pass an impeachment article against President 
Nixon.201 Thus, Congress is likely to treat a relatively wide range of pri-
vate misconduct by Presidents as inappropriate subject matter for the 
impeachment process. 
Moreover, no one seriously questions that in Johnson's impeach-
ment trial and Nixon's impeachment hearings in the House there were at 
least a few members of Congress who rose above party politics to make 
a principled judgment about the political and constitutional issues raised 
in those proceedings. In President Clinton's case, it is harder to identify 
such actors or to conclude that Congress as an institution performed on 
a predominantly neutral or nonpartisan basis. Certainly, most people 
have not yet been convinced that many, or perhaps any, members of the 
House or the Senate rose above partisan politics to make principled 
judgments about the impeachability of President Clinton's misconduct, 
while the virtual party-line votes in the House and the Senate reinforce 
the public's conclusions about the intense partisanship driving the pro-
ceedings.202 Consequently, a major question left open by the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings is not about the presidency at all. Rather, it is 
about whether President Clinton's impeachment proceedings will have 
heightened or lowered the confidence of subsequent generations in the 
capacity of members of Congress to rise above partisanship to make 
principled constitutional judgments in the course of impeachment pro-
ceedings. 
At least one piece of relevant data has generally been overlooked in 
the rush to criticize Congress for its handling of the Clinton impeach-
ment proceedings-that a remarkably large number of Representatives 
and Senators had had substantial prior experiences with impeachment,203 
200. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 905, 921 (1999). 
201. See The U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing on the Im-
peachment of the President, 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 846820 (statements of 
former Representatives Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY), Robert J. Drinan (D-MA), and Wayne Owens 
(D-UT)) (noting that because it was personal rather than official misconduct, President Nixon's tax 
evasion was not impeachable). 
202. See Polls Find Support for Verdict, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1999, at A31. 
203. Of the Representatives who participated in the House impeachment proceedings in the 
1980s, over 140 participated in President Clinton's House proceedings and at least 17 in his im-
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so that they cannot fairly be described as either naive or unqualified in 
this arena. The substantial familiarity of many members of Congress 
with prior impeachment practices almost certainly means that many of 
the risks undertaken in the Clinton impeachment proceedings, such as 
foregoing independent fact finding by the House or allowing a lame 
duck House to impeach the President, were calculated, even though they 
undermined the legitimacy of the House's judgment in the eyes of many 
Senators. By the same token, the choices of most Senators to expedite 
rather than prolong the President's impeachment trial was similarly cal-
culated, designed with the likely awareness that it would cost the pro-
ceedings some prestige in the views of subsequent historians. 
Moreover, there are other institutions for which the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings is likely to exact some serious consequences in 
the future. They revealed, for instance, the vulnerability of federal 
judges or unpopularly elected officials who might have to stand in 
judgment in the impeachment process. In addition, both the media and 
the legal academy lost some prestige and credibility in the public esti-
mation because of their predilection for speculation and hyperbole. 
Hence, the difficulty of identifying much positive from the institutional 
ramifications from the Clinton impeachment proceedings makes it far 
from clear the extent to which the proceedings will have set a model for 
future generations to follow or avoid. 
peachment trial. At least 51 Senators who participated in the latter trial participated in the Hastings 
and N'IXon impeachment trials. Sixty-seven Representatives who voted on President Clinton's im-
peachment served in the House during its investigation of President Nixon's misconduct, and 
seven members of the House Judiciary Committee that approved impeachment articles against 
President Nixon participated in either the House or Senate impeachment proceedings against 
President Clinton. Eleven Senators who participated in the Senate's investigation of President 
Nixon's misconduct participated in the Clinton trial. At least two members of Congress who par-
ticipated in the Clinton proceedings (Zoe Lofgren in the House and Fred Thompson in the Senate) 
served as staffers in Congress' investigations of President Nixon's misconduct. 
